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The topic of corruption is a difficult one to study, because it is dishonest and illegal behaviour, 
and reliable numbers for its incidence are hard to come by. Despite this, or perhaps because of 
this, it has become a popular field for researches from a multitude of disciplines including, 
economics, political science, anthropology, and sociology. The different academic fields are 
sometimes concerned with different aspects of the concept of corruption, including possible 
consequences in terms of economic growth, development, inequality, democracy, and social 
trust. The intricacies of corruption call for various perspectives to provide insights so to better 
understand this and related phenomena.  
 What is classified as ‘corruption’ varies between countries and contexts. In this study 
corruption is a form of dishonesty or criminal offense undertaken by a person or organisation 
entrusted with a position of authority, to acquire illicit benefit or abuse power for one’s private 
gain. Hence, corruption is a normative classification indicating an international moral standard 
set by different actors, such as Transparency International (Bukovansky 2002). This normative 
understanding might include behaviours considered acceptable in various parts of the world 
(Gupta 1995; Friedrich 2007). This may include cultural factors such as guanxi in China, where 
gifts are seen as the norm to maintain social relationships (Andvig & Fjeldstad 2001). In other 
cultures, family might be more integral and important to society than it usually is in the West, 
and as such, people hire family members into positions (nepotism) and give public gifts to their 
close family (corruption), while this not being described by their culture as corrupt, just how 
things are done (Gardiner 2007). Whether something can be considered corrupt or not is tied to 
culture, individual morality, and values. Actions what are for one person considered corrupt, 
might be justifiable for another (Melgar, Rossi & Smith 2010). 
The use of the term corruption is not always clear. Several analysts described corruption 
in terms of public officials using their power or public resources to gain privately, whether this is 
monetary gain, status, favours (Rose-Ackerman 1996; Stapenhurst 2000). Research on 
corruption presents a plethora of definition. Many definitions are concerned with a public official 
using public resources to enrich themselves. In legal terms, corruption is a transaction between a 
state official and one civilian, where the state official breaches the limits of laws and regulations 
to enrichen himself in the forms of a bribe (Andvig & Fjeldstad 2001: 9). But with this 
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explanation we will lose much of what is considered corruption, such as misappropriating public 
funds (embezzlement) or hiring close friends and family into public roles based on social ties 
instead of merit (favouritism/nepotism).  
This study will investigate the role of civil society and media usage for reducing 
corruption in Europe. Civil society is the idea of communities of citizens linked by common 
interests and collective activity, as a sort of third sector of society distinct from government and 
the markets. The media is often referred to as a watchdog for keeping track of malfeasance in 
politics, and medias role in fighting corruption is regularly recognised (Le Moglie & Turati 
2019; Sikorski 2018; Camaj 2013; Di Tella & Franceschelli 2011; Ralchev 2004; Brunetti & 
Weder 2003). When citizens follow news reported in media, they might give public officials less 
leeway to act as they would want, for example to use public power to benefit themselves. 
Through activism, which includes reading newspapers, voting, and interacting with media, 
citizens can keep the government in check (Fiorino, Galli & Goel 2019).  
Active consumers of news media and current affairs may be more prone to believe 
corruption is a problem because they are more exposed to it, even though they might not have 
experienced corruption personally. This can be problematic, as reported corruption may not be 
representative of the actual levels of corruption in a country (see Rose & Mishler 2010: Figure 
1). For example, media might report on many aggravated cases of corruption, while petty 
corruption is at a minimum. The latter may be more felt personally in the daily lives of citizens, 
but the aggravated corruption cases brought up in media may have people report differently to 
what is happening in reality. This ties in with the reporting often used in corruption studies, 
perception. Perception might be a lot higher than experienced corruption, which could have 
adverse effects in the economy (Melgar et al. 2010). On the other side, countries with citizens 
who consider corrupt behaviour to be more excusable may have a media which does not report 
on corruption. Having a media which reports on corruption is itself an indicator that this type of 
behaviour is socially unacceptable. Hence, the media reporting on corruption may reflect both he 
incidence and the non-acceptance of corruption. 
The perception of corruption is not a perfect measurement. Still, it is considered by some 
as the best available quantitative data in the often-grey area of corruption research (Heath, 
Richards, & de Graaf 2016). Using perceptions to analyse corruption can be justified by W.I. 
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Thomas’s theorem: ‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’1. In this 
study we use data from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and data from 
the European Social Survey about economic morality, this will, of course, be explained 






Hypothesis: The incidence of corruption is lower in countries with an active civil society. By 
“active civil society” we mean when individual residents of a country watch the news and 
current affairs. If people are watching the news, they can actively get rid of corrupt behaviour 
using democratic systems; in other words: voting corrupt politicians out of office. If this is done, 
it sets a precedent for politicians to not act corruptly because they will not receive votes. For 
other public officials that are not voted into their occupation, the democratic systems may also 
work indirectly. There is the possibility that politicians with an anti-corruption agenda are more 
likely to be voted into office, and if so, they make also take actions to further reduce or prevent 
corruption. It is not possible to vote for different police officers or bureaucratic workers in the 
welfare system. So, what can an active civil society do with corrupt individuals who are not 
prone to the wrath of democratic dealings? If people believe corruption to be a big issue in their 
country, they might vote in someone who campaigns in dealing with the issue, like “draining the 
swamp” - replacing corrupt actors with fresh anti-corruption representatives.  
The incidence of corruption is difficult to assess. In this study, we will use various 
indicators. Some are based on the assessments of international business people, others are based 
on the assessments of general populations in Europe. Regular people might experience different 










Corruption may be classified as petty, routine, or aggravated (Heidenheimer 2007) depending on 
different factors like the amounts of monetary loss or sectors where corrupt behaviour has taken 
place. Some studies focus on the public aspects of corruption, having corruption tied directly to 
public officials. A known researcher on corruption, J. S. Nye defines corruption as: “Corruption 
is behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding 
(family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of 
certain types of private-regarding influence. This definition includes such behaviour as bribery 
(use of reward to pervert the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal 
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).” (Nye 2007: 284). This definition 
is quite clear on what political corruption is, but does it encompass what regular people think 
when presented with the question of what corruption is? Corruption can be a diffuse term, and 
cover so much different behaviour that it might be hard to know what people truly think of when 
asked about it. Perhaps Huntington’s short definition better encompasses what regular people 
more immediately think of when the word corruption is used: “Corruption is behaviour of public 
officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends” (Huntington 2007).  
Corruption is often thought of as synonymous with bribery, but it can be so much more. 
“Corruption, while being tied particularly to the act of bribery, a general term covering misuse of 
authority as a result of considerations of personal gains, which need not be monetary” (Friedrich 
2007: 7). It is crucial to remember that corruption is not only based around monetary gain, failure 
to do so is a failure to understand human will. Is it most important to gain capital in economic 
form, or social capital, or perhaps cultural capital? Social ties might play just as important of a 
role as money does, if not more. Being allowed to build that extension on your summer house 
because the public official in charge of such decisions is your Saturday night dinner guest. 
Dodging the drunk driving charge because your dad knows the police chief. Using connections 
to “get things done” is by many in Russia the preferred method in order to get into hospital or to 
get a permit or official document (Rose & Mishler 2010: Table 4.1).  
Bribery is a payment in some form (often monetary) that is given to taken between 
corrupt actors. When a public official trades his or her services for a transfer in value it is 
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considered corruption. Public officials can offer under the table deals for their private benefit to 
potential companies or individuals. The companies or individuals paying the bribe to the public 
official can potentially enjoy a sped up bureaucratic process, skip regulations, get clearances they 
would not otherwise get etc. Bribery can crop up in many ways, and it is not always as easy as 
money changing hands.  
 Another form of corruption is embezzlement. Embezzlement is misappropriation of 
resources by employees who are supposed to administer it. Public official may, for example, use 
public tax money to build a new floor onto his or her house. Embezzlement is considered 
included in corruptions broader definition, as it does not include a civilian – other than the 
general public, which arguably had the rights to the resources embezzled (Andvig & Fjeldstad 
2001). There is also a danger with embezzlement that it can be institutionalized within corrupt 
countries and consequently used by the ruling elites to enrichen themselves.  
 There is a pressing distinction when it comes to the difference between bribery and 
extortion, where bribery is initiated by the private citizen and extortion by the public official 
(Granovetter 2007). Extortion is sometimes referred to as extracting a bribe, where the public 
official threatens out the bribe from the civilian. Those with the power to extort may coerce or 
threaten to get what they want, without giving much or anything to the civilian(s). Examples of 
extortion from public officials could be threats of long wait times, harassment from the tax 
departments, or that they will find something to charge you with if you do not pay up.  
 Fraud is also considered a form of corruption. Fraud is the intentional deception in order 
to secure yourself some economic gain. Public officials can manipulate information in order to 
extract private profit, either tricking people or turning a blind eye to crime which they enjoy a 
share from. Falsifying documents, for example, forging fake passports is considered fraud.  
 Lastly, favouritism and nepotism are considered corruption. Abusing power to favour 
family and friends is referred to as favouritism within the corruption sphere (Andvig & Fjeldstad 
2001). Favouritism from a public official can be their proclivity to distribute public resources in 
beneficial ways to their closest network. For example, granting them building rights, giving them 
a job, helping them before someone else, or flat out granting them money from the public funds 
(which would include some other forms of corruption as well). Nepotism is the preference of 
family members. Hiring a family member to an office position regardless of their merit could be 
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considered nepotism. It should be noted that there might be some differences in what constitutes 
bribes, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, and favouritism between countries and contexts. 
Corruption is typically seen as a problem which seeps into many facets of modern society 
and everyday life of citizens (Heath, Richards, & de Graf 2016; Prasad, da Silva, & Nickow 
2019). It is considered to have several unfavourable outcomes, such as poverty, economic 
growth, development, clean energy, equality, peace and justice2. The dominant perspective, 
certainly in Western countries is to see corruption as something negative, a problem in society. 
However, an alternative perspective holds that corruption could in some situations be beneficial 
to a society. Corruption might reduce bureaucracy, speeding up administrative practices giving 
the economy a quick boost (Huntington 2007). Instead of waiting for the machine to slowly 
churn out whatever it is that you need, you can grease the wheels to make it go faster. In other 
words, corruption can lead to efficiency. This can be especially important in developing 
countries with newly formed bureaucracies, based on historical political developments in British 
and American systems during the 18th and 19th centuries (Nye 2007). We can view corruption as 
a necessary part of the evolution to become a modern, developed nation, as there is a need for 
economic development. Corruption might be the short-term answer to a long-term plan, although 
the beneficial effects of corruption are scarce (Ahmad, Ullah & Arfeen 2012).  
















Consequences of corruption 
 
Corruption may breed inequality, since those with the most resources will be able to use 
corruption to their benefit, at least more often than the resource starved (You & Khagram 2005). 
The poor may be more prone to extortion and can find it difficult to hold those with power 
accountable as inequality increases. Having a bureaucracy based on honesty and integrity is 
praised for helping prevent and combat corruption.  
The arguments against corruption are by some called ‘sand in the wheels’ hypothesis, 
implying the impact of corruption on bureaucracies (and thereby the economy) grinds the wheels 
to a halt. Public officials may cause delays which otherwise might not have appeared so they can 
extract a bribe (Myrdal 2007). Preserving their income through perpetuating corrupt behaviour 
which benefits them. Potentially creating more channels in which people have to come through 
bureaucrats in order to conduct business (or whatever they desire really) is perhaps encouraged 
when public officials are bribed. Méon & Weill (2009) point out that corruption might not be the 
best way to award a licence to the most efficient producer. A winner of a competitive, corrupt 
auction for a licence which may perhaps be profitable, may only win because they are the most 
optimistic. Rose-Ackerman (1997) argues the highest briber could be the most compromising 
actor willing to reduce the quality of the goods they will produce. There is also a possibility of 
investors getting somewhat frightened by dealing with corrupt actors, which may cause them to 
not invest as much as they would otherwise do. All this support the theory of corruption as 
inefficient – the sand which makes the wheels go slower.  
Other studies focus more on the potentially positive outcomes of corruption, suggesting 
corruption can help countries in certain situations. These situations can be the process of 
modernization and ineffective bureaucracies (Leys 2007; Huntington 2007). A typical argument 
is that corruption can act as a lesser evil, replacing violence with functions which fill demands, 
although imperfect. Instead of violent revolutions overthrowing government institutions, 
corruption makes institutions workable.  
Some studies have tried calculating the costs and benefits of corruption, implying there 
might be different considerations within societies which can benefit or be hindered by corruption 
(Nye 2007). Arguments claiming that benefits can be achieved through corruption are often 
11 
 
called ‘greasing the wheels’ hypotheses, indicating the ineffective, grinding wheels of 
bureaucracy can be lathered in grease, increasing effectiveness by reducing red tape.  
A negative perspective on corruption is more popular, however. Corruption has been 
touted by some as detrimental for economic growth and contributes to more inequality in 
societies plagued by it. Trusting corrupt public officials can be a lot to ask for investors, causing 
investments into known corrupt countries to dry up (Mauro 1995). Some researchers have argued 
for the costly nature of corruption in both the developed and the developing world (Heath, 
Richards, & de Graaf 2016). Heath et al. (2016) theorize both macro and micro foundations for 
corruptions cost. On a micro level, an individual may or may not consider bribery or extortion in 
a situation from a cost-benefit analysis. Depending on what position a public official hold, how 
much the bribe is, chances of being reported or exposed, they can make a rational choice in 
regard to bribery and extortion. The macro-level theories consider societies with widespread 
corruption to be hard to “cure”, since there is no incentive for public officials to play by the 
rules, since condemnation from their corrupt behaviour is unlikely to happen (You & Khagram 
2005; Heath et al. 2016). This may trigger habitual norms of behaviour, making it very hard to 
break out of cycles of corruption because it’s just “how things are done” – or what You & 
Khagram (2005) call vicious circles of inequality and corruption. Countries could be trapped in 
the vicious circles of inequality and corruption or be liberated in virtues circles of equality and 
integrity, which are both hard to break out from. Corruption is pervasive and notable in many 
countries around the world, and it may hinder development through the high costs it brings with 
it. Both territorial bribery for economic expansion, and the need for secrecy of corrupt behaviour 
can be very costly (Shleifer & Vishny 1993). Through the necessity of permits and licences, 
private industries are vitally dependent on governments to supply these, which they have a 
monopoly over, in order to conduct business. Depending on bureaucracy integrity and efficiency, 
corruption may hinder investment and growth (Mauro 1995). According to Mauro (1995), 
investment rates will rise with improvements in bureaucratic integrity and efficiency. 
International organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also view corruption as a considerable 
challenge to economic development (Méon & Weill 2009).  
Empirical research provides findings indicating that corruption is detrimental to the 
economy, and a catalyst for inequality. Mauro (1995), using an index of corruption from 
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Business International, found a strong negative association between investment rate and 
corruption. This finding was regardless of the amount of red tape (high value of red tape 
fostering need for corruption to grease the wheels). There were no significant differences in low-
red-tape and high-red-tape countries - they had similar regression slopes while a standardised 
correlation (reported as R2 statistics) was higher for countries where the bureaucracy had high 
levels of integrity and efficiency (Mauro 1995). This providing no support for claims of slow 
bureaucracies needing corruption as a beneficial support to speed up growth (Mauro 1995). 
Further he finds statistically significant evidence that countries with higher corruption receive 
lower ratios of investments – with one-standard-deviation increase of improvement in the 
corruption index is associated with an increase in the investment rate by 2.9 per cent of GDP 
(Mauro 1995). You and Khagram (2005) provide empirical evidence for the theory of the 
reciprocal causation between inequality and corruption. They find that countries with high levels 
of corruption have more inequality. To measure income inequality, they used gini coefficients 
from sources such as the UN-WIDER Income Inequality Database. The gini coefficient ranges 
from 0 to 1, with a gini of 0 representing perfect equality, and a gini of 1 meaning that only one 
person or household has the total income in the country. In their regression analysis they find an 
increase in the gini coefficient on corruption from 0.23 to 0.63 or 0.73, with it being significant 
at the 1 per cent level (You & Khagram 2005). Their findings are consistent with other findings, 
such as Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Therme (2002) and Li, Xu, and Zou (2003).  
Other studies have investigated more negative aspects of the ‘greasing of the wheels’ 
argument. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) found that firms that paid more bribes were also more 
likely to spend more management time negotiating with public officials and spent more money. 
Their data focused mainly on the time senior managers of firms had to spend with bureaucrats 
negotiating regulations. In their country-level regression measuring time wasted by senior 
managers of perms with public officials on a constant, they found a slope-coefficient of 0.29, 
which was statistically significant at the 5 per cent level (Kaufmann & Wei 1999).  
Some studies argue that corruption might be an effective lubricant to the grinding gears 
of bureaucratic governance, which does not necessarily mean it is good or bad, but a solution to a 
problem (Leys 2007; Huntington 2007). This has been used as an especially prudent argument in 
developing states, in the beginning stages of the modernization process. The case is that the 
painful process of modernization can be somewhat eased by corruption, and punishing 
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developing countries for their corrupt behaviour through the lens of Western ideals might hinder 
developing countries progress. Nye (2007) notes that corruption probably has had positive and 
negative influences on Russian and American economic development, and that moralists may 
have to tone down their rhetoric regarding corruption in developing countries. Corruption may be 
a possible perk for public officials who would otherwise choose another line of work due to low 
government wages (Leys 2007).  
Empirical evidence to prove the argument ‘grease the wheels’ theory is rather sparse. 
Méon & Weill (2009) found some evidence to suggest that greasing the wheels in countries with 
weak institutional frameworks is less detrimental. Countries with very ineffective institutions 
may receive efficiency benefits from corruption, though this could hurt them in the long run.  
 
 
Perceptions and experiences of corruption 
 
There are different approaches to measure the scope of corruption, and perceptions and 
experiences are the main measurements of corruption. Perceptions and experiences of corruption 
do not necessarily correlate highly in studies, perceptions of corruption in a country may be high, 
even though individuals are rarely experiencing corrupt behaviour personally (Rose & Mishler 
2010). This also applies when comparing perceptions and experiences of corruption between 
countries, there might be other factors than experienced corruption to make people believe that 
their country is corrupt – like trust in public officials or public institutions (Solè-Ollè & Sorribas-
Navarro 2018). Who reports corruption might also pose an issue with perceptions and 
experiences, as respondents who are international business people or other elites (CPI) could 
perceive corruption to be something different than citizens of a particular nation. Business people 
may have different interests and biases which are not as indicative of general public interests, 
such as low taxes and less regulation (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2007). A reason for low 
correlation between perception and experiences of corruption could also be a consequence of 
error margins stemming from the comparative few amounts of people actually experiencing 
corrupt behaviour versus everyone’s perception of it. People are able to believe corruption to be 
an issue in their own country, and in others, but experiencing bribery or extortion in the real 
world may be rare.  
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Some studies have investigated the relationship between the perception of corruption and 
experienced corruption. Can we trust national-level indexes to be a reasonable metric for 
measuring corruption which is happening, experienced by citizens? Some studies have found 
correlations between perceived corruption as measured by national-level indexes and 
experienced corruption within a country (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2006; Kaufmann et al. 
2007; Melgar, Rossi, & Smith 2010). Kaufmann et al. (2006 and 2007) argue that expert 
assessments over national-level indexes are good indicators for reality. Melgar et al. (2010) focus 
on reasons for people’s perceptions on corruption, and they argue that even when corruption 
perception strongly varies from the current level of corruption, the latter influences the former. 
Gonzales, Mackenna, & Muñoz (2019) argue people form mental images of corruption beyond 
their personal experiences with corruption. People’s everyday experiences of corruption are tied 
to a general perception of corruption, for example, hearing about corrupt politicians on the news 
can influence people to believe corruption is a pervasive issue. What other people (often mass 
media) have reported might also influence people’s opinions on issues of national interest, for 
example corruption (Gonzales et al. 2019). In their empirical findings, they find a moderately 
high positive effect of experiencing bribes on national perception levels of corruption 
(coefficient 0.03), being significant at the 0.01 level (Gonzales et al 2019).  
Other studies focus on the relationship between perceptions and experiences of 
corruption (Weber Abramo 2008; Rose & Mishler 2010; Donchev & Ujhelyi 2014). In their 
studies, they question what perceptions of corruption really measure. There might be a lot of talk 
in news about grand corruption, which may not translate into experienced petty corruption in 
lower rungs of the bureaucracy. Rose & Mishler (2010) found that 86% of Russians surveyed 
said they learned about corruption from national television and the news. The Russian 
respondents also reported that they though most officials were corrupt, even though the 
respondents never experiences bribery personally. This could be because the national corruption 
in Russia is so high (second highest), so people generalize corruption to be an issue in everyday 
life, even though they may never experience it themselves. Donchev & Ujhelyi (2014) are 




Kaufmann et al. (2006) checked the correlation between expert assessments and the 
Global Competitiveness Report3 (GCS) (2002-2005). They found high correlations between 
them, for example correlations for control of corruption 2002-2005: 0.77, 0.80, 0.82, 0.80 for 
experts and 0.79, 0.83, 0.83, 0.82 for GCS. This, according to Kaufman et al. (2007) should 
douse any doubt as to biases in cross-country expert assessments. Testing business people’s 
biases on what constitutes good governance, Kaufmann et al. (2007) assess correlations between 
surveys of different firms. The correlation between the World Competitiveness Yearbook4 and 
the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey5 (BEEPS) are 0.74 and 0.43. 
Melgar et al. (2010 find evidence to suggest that corruption perception at the micro-level may be 
shaped by personal characteristics. Using data from the International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP), they find that self-employment (1.30 percentage points increase), working in the private 
sector, being divorced, being unemployed, and being a woman are positively correlated with 
corruption perception, while those in full-time employment, being married, attending religious 
services, higher education, and the state of democracy (6.9 percentage points decrease) are less 
likely to report corruption (Melgar et al. 2010). This means there may be groups of people who 
are more likely to engage in bribery as they tend to believe that corruption is high.  
Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) suggest that corruption experience is a weak predictor of 
corruption perception, and that corruption perception from indices are biased by factors which 
reduce corruption – such as economic development, democratisation, and Protestantism. With 
their comparison between experience measures from households and the business sectors, plus 
the standard corruption perception indices, they found that a number of factors which were 
commonly thought to cause corruption seemed to bias perceptions away from experience 
(Donchev & Ujhelyi 2014). One of their findings suggests that 15 – 30% more of the variation in 
corruption perceptions can be explained by general measures of culture, economic development, 
and political institutions, then for corruption experience. Corruption perception indices as such 
may be more affected by country characteristics that cannot explain corruption experience.  
 
3 The Global Competitiveness Report integrates the macroeconomic and business aspects of competitiveness into a 
single index. The report "assesses the ability of countries to provide high levels of prosperity to their citizens". This 
in turn depends on how productively a country uses available resources.  
4 The World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) is the leading annual report on the competitiveness of countries 
using 330 criteria measuring different facets of performance of 63 economies.  
5 The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is an extensive survey undertaken as a 
joint initiative by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
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Using Russia as a test case, Rose & Mishler (2010) argue that most people do not base 
their personal experience paying bribes when asked about perceived corruption. They provide a 
weak correlation between generalised perception of corruption and paying a bribe (r = 0.09). 
75% of people who view most officials as corrupt had not had anyone in their family pay a bribe 
in the past 2 years.  
Arguably, the argued gap between perceived corruption and experienced corruption does 
not diminish the importance of perceived corruption, as it might be an important part of people’s 
attitude towards public officials and governments in general, as well as their trust in political 
figures (Donchev & Ujhelyi 2014). As Treitsman (2000: 412) puts it: “The perception of 
corruption may have as serious consequences for economic development as corruption itself.” It 
has also been argued that survey-based general perceptions of corruption can be a promising 
avenue for sociological research (Heath, Richards, & de Graaf 2016; Gonzalez, Mackenna, & 
Muñoz 2019). However, as Heath et al. (2016) point out, there might be some faults in trying to 
fit large, national indices into research about corruption, as what constitutes as corruption varies 
so much in different contexts, cultures, and regions. Heath et al. (2016) instead argue for a more 
disaggregated approach to corruption, meaning a more distinguished look at differences in 
corruption, instead of a big ‘lump’ of generalized assumptions stewed into the word ‘corruption’. 
Experienced and perceived corruption in the population may be different than what globalist 
experts’ experiences and perceptions are, and some issues with using perception-based surveys 




Media and news 
 
This study focuses on corruption and the role of an active civil society from citizens watching the 
news and current affairs. The media are supposed to shine a light through the darkness, revealing 
information the public in general would not be privy to know, such as abuses of power (Price 
2019). For example, investigating where government money goes, which organisations get what 
– and perhaps why. This, among other things, is why a free press is often touted as a good tool 
for keeping corruption in check (Brunetti & Weder 2003; Dutta & Roy 2016). For the purposes 
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of this study we must look to earlier findings on people’s interaction with media and news in 
Europe. In the current times of extreme choice opportunities, where people can choose what 
media to engage with, will people still watch the news? Also, are public officials being held 
accountable for their actions when corruption gets reported on in the news?  
 Research on news usage is an evolving comparative field. Some argue on a theoretical 
level that following news and current affairs is important for being able to criticize or punish 
public officials, and being an informed citizen.  
Some studies argue there are increasing gaps in entertainment and news watching over 
time (Prior 2005; Aalberg, Blekesaune, & Elvestad 2013). Over time there has been an increase 
in choices presented to us in media. People can now, more than ever before, choose exactly what 
they want to watch, read, or listen to. It is now possible to exclusively engage only with what 
people want – there are media options for only entertainment, and choices for only news and 
current affairs. Choices between television channels with news 24/7, newspapers, and Internet 
news in written or video form – and on the other side, entertainment channels, gossip magazines, 
and Internet content purely for entertainment purposes. There are some blurred lines on what 
could be considered entertainment, news, and current affairs. The show Fiks Fare could be an 
example of this, revealing everyday experiences of corruption in Albania through satire (Musaraj 
2018). Another example of this is late night shows using politics for entertainment. Prior (2005) 
mentions previous decades of television watching where it was not as easy to choose what you 
wanted to watch, so incidental news watching was possible. Television viewers who were less 
interested in politics had no choice in watching the news from time to time (Aalberg et al. 2013). 
Being an ill-informed citizen can thus not be considered to be caused by a lack of ability to 
watch the news and current affairs, but to motivation to do so. The gap could be due to people 
with low levels of social capital tuning out the the news, indicating a disconnect from society and 
personal networks (Blekesaune, Elvestad, & Aalberg 2012). The gaps between those who watch 
the news and those who abstain could also be related to political interest (Shehata & Strömback 
2011). 
Being able to hold public officials accountable for their actions required their actions to 
be public, i.e. in the news. Corrupt public officials can only face the wrath of civil society if 
people know what they have done – thus requiring a news media which exposes them. Press 
freedom is touted by many for its ability to curb corruption (Brunetti & Weder 2001; Camaj 
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2013; Dutta & Roy 2016; Mancini, Mazzoni, Cornia, & Marchetti 2017). With increases in press 
freedom and higher levels of electoral participation, corruption levels in countries tend to 
decrease (Camaj 2013). Through media investigation and reporting of news, the public can 
combat corruption, if they desire to do so, through actively participating in civil society – for 
example through voting. Some studies have found links between scandals and votes in elections, 
in that politicians who are implicated in scandals receive less votes (Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé, & 
Sorribas-Navarro 2012; Song 2016). News and stories on current affairs may help citizens make 
more informed decisions and give them the opportunity to hold public officials accountable for 
their behaviour. In their study of corruption accountability of politicians in Spain, Costas-Pérez 
et al. (2012) find that vote loss following a corruption scandal rose with the number of news 
reports on the matter. With less than ten news reports, vote loss was around 4%, while above ten 
news reports it rose to 9%. Costas-Pérez et al. (2012) argue that this may have considerable 
effects on who sits in public office, since there are low average vote margins with which Spanish 
elections are won. But this requires wide media coverage, which is not necessarily happening for 
every case.  
Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2018) go further with the research on corruption scandals 
in Spain, finding correlations between corruption scandals and local trust in local politicians and 
perceptions on corruption. They use quantitative data on corruption scandals from news coverage 
in national and regional Spanish newspapers. When a corruption scandal is reported, 6.2% of the 
overall population shifts from trusting to not trusting politicians. There is also a shift in 
perception that takes place in the occurrence of corruption scandals almost equal to the results 
listed above. 7.5% of citizens shift from low to high perceptions of corruption in the aftermath of 
a corruption scandal. There might be a link between corruption scandals, corruption perception 
and trust in local government. Perceptions change, and so people are less likely to trust the 
government. Sikorski (2018) explains in his meta-analysis of political scandals that there are 
many different themes or factors which play a role in whether a politician is re-elected in the 
aftermath of a political scandal, for example, what type of scandal it was, the characteristics of 
the politician and their response to their own transgression, general attitudes of the voter base 
and other contextual aspects. Corruption causes some voter loss, but it has usually not been 
enough to make the corrupt politicians lose elections, especially if the corrupt behaviour benefits 
the population in some way (Sikorski 2018: 3121). 
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Civil society and activity  
 
 “People’s indifference is the best breeding ground for corruption to grow”  
– Delia Ferraria 
 
In this study, we use the term “civil society” frequently. What we try to achieve with this term is 
an explanation of an active citizenry which differs from the government and the market. Civil 
society must be understood as something outside the public institutions; it is the realm of 
everyday private citizens who, through their actions and behaviour, control and enforce norms. 
Going out and voting (as mentioned previously) or protesting represents an active way to 
participate in civil society, while watching the news and current affairs presents a passive way to 
participate. Through communicative behaviour, with the information we are able to gather, we 
can discuss what needs to be done for the possible betterment or improvement of society (see 
Habermas 1984). Because the concept of corruption is hard to grasp, civil society plays a crucial 
role in finding and enforcing corruption. Through active participation, people can share their 
experiences and inform others on what is happening with their public officials. Perhaps there is 
an area of government which is particularly corrupt, and people who experience it report it to the 
news, sparking debate, reforms, or different voting patterns in the next election. Transparency 
through civil society organisations weaponize civil society to confront secretive or unresponsive 
governments or corporations (Sampson 2010).  
 Civil society rests on an idea of common values and shared goals based on horizontal 
trust and reciprocity (Putnam 1993). An active civil society can advance social capital elements 
within a society, such as trust, norms, and shared values. If civil society is actively “used” on the 
political sphere, democracy can improve. Putnam (1993) argues that it is not wealth which 
creates an active civil society, but that civil society creates wealth.  
The importance of civil society in combating corruption has been noted in many studies 
(Ralchev 2004; Fiorino, Galli, & Goel 2019; Rasmussen & Reher 2019). The idea is that 
centralized power in institutions is not enough to keep corruption in check; there is also a need 
for decentralized power in the hands of citizens. “Civil society” becomes a term for the 
community-driven norms which punishes bad faith actors, in this study’s case, corrupt actors. 
These corrupt actors can often be part of the centralized power; politicians, law enforcers, or 
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bureaucrats, which means it can be hard for institutions themselves to catch them without the 
help of citizen enforcement – an active civil society. An active civil society can be described as a 
form of social capital (Rasmussen & Reher 2019). Civil society can be the death ringers for any 
sitting public official if properly organised. Organised forms of civil society are often called non-
governmental organisations, or NGOs.  
 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can be an important tool to foster activism in 
civil society. Not only in the obvious that they are not officially part of the state government, but 
they can start engagement in the population with regards to policy dialogue and create 
opportunities and organise for people to actively participate in politics (Ralchey 2004). NGOs 
interested in battling corruption can, as an example, organise people to protest the government, 
help journalists to pick up stories on corrupt behaviour, or protect whistle-blowers when need be. 
Transparency International (TI) is an example of an NGO with the goal of uncovering and 
stopping corruption. It might be important to mention that it is in the best interest of these 
organisations to show corruption to be a problem, so they can continue to practice their power 
and receive donations from people and nations in order to fix the particular issue they are 
occupied with. There might also be an issue with compressing an intricate term like corruption 
into a standardized numeric value ranging from 0-100 (Sampson 2010). 
Fiorino, Galli, & Goel (2019) published an article studying the influence that civic 
activism could have in exposing corruption in Italian regions. According to them, civic activism 
can take various dimensions, such as newspaper reading, media participation, voting, 
volunteering, internet blogging etc. They distinguish between two forms of activism: active, such 
as interacting with media and voting, and passive activism such as blood donations or 
volunteering. Information flows through the media can empower civil society by showing them 
corrupt behaviour (Fiorino et al. 2019). A free media (free of government) can act as a watch dog 
against governmental corruption in showing the voters how they are acting – transparency. 
Doing so may lead to civil activism, getting people interested in doing something to stop this 
behaviour, such as voting, protesting, or writing about it themselves in letters to the editor, often 
featured in newspapers. There is, however, an issue with the information flows, namely that they 
can be manipulated by other interests. This can be governments taking control over media 
channels, media partisanship leading to only focusing on corruption of one side and ignoring the 
other (Mancini et al. 2017). 
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 Ralchev (2004) investigated civil society’s role in fighting corruption and organised 
crime in Southeast Europe. He theorises that civil society organisations, along with awareness 
from media, are pivotal in fighting corruption and organised crime (Ralchev 2004). Using 
multilevel regression analysis on data on opinion on 20 specific policy issues in 30 European 
countries, Rasmussen & Reher (2019) find evidence to suggest civic engagement can improve 
the quality of democracy through issue-specific information. Their findings propose that civil 
society organisations appear to act as important information distributing agents, helping reduce 
uncertainty between citizens and policy-makers. There is empirical evidence to offer credence to 
the necessity of citizens participation in policing the commons, as Abdallah, Sayed, Rahwan, 
LeVeck, Cebrian, Rutherford, and Fowler (2014) put it. It seems that more decentralized 
governments relying on civil society engagement flourish more in regard to public goods6 
(Abdallah et al. 2014). Civil society can be argued to be a part of the checks and balances to hold 
actors, such as public officials, in order.  
 Critics and sceptics of civil society challenge the altruism of civil society organisations. 
One of the claims is that NGO’s are often not very transparent to the public, and they are rarely 
held accountable themselves (Ebrahim 2003; Townsend & Townsend 2004). Another critical 
claim on NGOs is the failure of internal controls, noting lax oversight, internal control, and 
absence of checks and balances, leading NGOs to become breeding grounds for corruption 
(Gibelman & Gelman 2004). Gibelman & Gelman (2004) show several cases of wrongdoing in 
NGOs over time, noting rhetoric regarding recommendations for improvements so that this does 
not continue to happen. Despite this, abuses continue, and new forms of misconduct emerge, 
such as excessive compensations and conflicts of interest. NGOs fighting corruption might 
themselves become corrupt, or as Nietzsche put it: “Whoever fights monsters should see to it that 
in the process he does not become a monster. And if you gaze long enough into the abyss, the 
abyss will gaze back into you.”  
Some criticisms of the term civil society argue that the term is too broad, what does civil 
society actually apply to, and because of this, how useful can the term be (Torsello 2012). 
Torsello (2012) also argue that the terms origins – Western Europe, classical Greek and Latin 
 
6 A public good is a product that an individual can consume without reducing its availability to others and of which 
no one is deprived. Examples include law enforcement, national defense, sewer systems, public parks, and the air we 




philosophy – means the term “civility” is somewhat tainted with the sting from where it 
originated and is hard to apply in other areas of the world. This is something similar to what we 
have argued on “corruption”: context, geography, and cultures matter and change what people 
believe to be “corrupt” or “civil”. This is in part the reason this study focuses on European 
countries – there might be some differences in perceptions of what corruption or civility is in the 






This study uses a comparative approach to study corruption and news consumption. We seek to 
understand if corruption is more prevalent in European countries where the public opinion or at 
least large selections of the public are not watching the news and current affairs. This approach 
has limitations because the number of countries is relatively few, and they are also different in 
terms of many other characteristics than the ones we are investigating. There are also 
measurement problems associated with the spread of corruption, and this may lead to 
measurement errors in our study. 
The empirical analysis investigates on two data sources: Transparency International and 
the European Social Survey. Transparency International and the European Social Survey are 
both survey data, but they rely on different types of informants. Transparency International rely 
on experts in different fields, and their data collection and methods will be explained further 
under “corruption perception”. European Social Survey collects data from face-to-face 
interviews within all participating countries. There is a national funding agency in each country 
which appoints a National Coordinator and a survey organisation to implement the survey 
according to the common ESS specification. The specifications put forth by ESS are to ensure 
accuracy of the data in each country, and so the data can compare easily across countries.  
We have also included data on country wealth (measured as DGP), income distribution 
(measured as the GINI coefficient), and education levels (measured as expected years schooling), 
everything collected from the United Nations Development Report for 2010. We use these data 
to check our main findings regarding the news variable with other independent variables.  
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Business elite data on corruption 
 
To measure our dependent variable, corruption, we use data from Transparency International’s 
corruption perceptions index (CPI), from the year 2012. We use the corruption perceptions index 
from 2012 because it lines up well with our data from the European Social Survey (ESS) years 
2008-2011. The hope is to attempt to show how the independent variables from the ESS that 
were conducted in the years before effects perceived corruption in European countries. We also 
investigated the CPI correlation between the years 2012, 2013, and 2014 which resulted in near 
perfect correlation (r = 0.99-1.00) (Table 1.1). 
 
 
Table 1.1: Correlation between Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index years 2012, 
2013, and 2014.  
 
 
The CPI is widely used and regarded as one of the best indicators for measuring 
corruption (Solis & Antenangeli 2017; Camaj 2013; Zakaria 2012; Rose & Mishler 2010; You & 
Khargram 2005; Andvig & Fjeldstad 2001). This index ranks 180 countries and territories by 
their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople. It uses 
a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. The index is a combination 
of 13 surveys and assessments of corruption, collected by a variety of reputable institutions. It is 
the most widely used indicator of corruption worldwide.  
The CPI methodology follows four basic steps, as described in their 2012 technical 
methodology note: selection of source data, rescaling source data, aggregating the rescaled data 
and then reporting a measure for uncertainty. There is also a strict quality control mechanism 
which consists of parallel independent calculations conducted by two in- house researchers and 
two academic advisors with no affiliation to Transparency International. In order to create the 
 CPI 2012 CPI 2013 CPI 2014 
CPI 2012 1.000   
CPI 2013 0.992 1.000  
CPI 2014 0.987 0.996 1.000 
24 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International draws upon different data sources 
which have the purpose of capturing the assessments of experts and business executives on 
different corrupt behaviours in the public sector, which include: bribery, diversion of public 
funds, use of public office for private gain, nepotism in the civil service, and state capture. Some 
sources also include the mechanisms accessible for corruption prevention in a nation, for 
example: the government’s ability to enforce integrity mechanisms, effective prosecutions of 
corrupt politicians, red tape and excessive bureaucratic burdens, the existence of adequate laws 
on financial disclosures, conflict of interest preventions and access to information, and legal 
protection for whistle-blowers, journalists and investigators. The aim of the CPI is to provide a 
more reliable picture of the perceived level of corruption around the world than any of the 
thirteen sources could independently.  
 
The source data for the CPI 2012 are a collection of the 13 sources of information (Table 
1.2). Not every country is rated by every source – some focus on regions or other forms of 
collections of countries. Our study focuses on Europe, so we include here the questions asked to 
those reporting corruption perception in European countries. The sources not included below are 
the African Development Bank Governance Ratings and The Political and Economic Risk 



















 Experts were asked by the Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators to 
assess “To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private 
interests?” Scores were given on a scale of 1 (highest level of corruption) to 10 (lowest level of 
corruption). A low score of 1 to 2 meant “public officeholders can exploit their offices for 
private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity”. The highest 
scores of 9 to 10 meant “legal, political and public integrity effectively prevent public 
officeholders from abusing their positions.” This was done to 31 OECD countries.  
 The Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index asked experts to assess: “To what 
extent are public officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted or penalized?” A low score 
of 1 to 2 means “Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption can do so without 
fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity”, while a high score of 9 to 10 means “Office 
holders who break the law and engage in corruption are prosecuted rigorously under established 
Source Number of 
countries 
1. African Development Bank Governance Ratings (AFDB) 53 
2. Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators (BF-SGI) 31 
3. Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index (BF-BTI) 128 
4. Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings (EIU) 138 
5. Freedom House Nations in Transit (FH) 29 
6. Global Insight Country Risk Ratings (GI) 175 
7. IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (IMD) 59 
8. Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence (PERC) 16 
9. Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 140 
10. Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (TI) 29 
11. World Bank - Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (WB) 67 
12. World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey (WEF)  147 
13. World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (WJP) 97 
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laws and always attract adverse publicity.” Experts were further asked to assess: “To what extent 
does the government successfully contain corruption?” Assessments ranged from a low of 1 to 2 
where “The government fails to contain corruption, and there are no integrity mechanisms in 
place.” A high assessment, 9 to 10, meant “The government is successful in containing 
corruption, and all integrity mechanisms are in place and effective.” The scores were given on a 
scale of 1 to 10, where 10 was the lowest level of corruption and 1 was the highest level of 
corruption. The experts assessed 128 countries and territories  
 The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings asked teams of experts supported 
by a global network of in-country specialist a number of corruption questions. The included 
specific guiding questions presented were:  
• “Are there clear procedures and accountability governing the allocation and use of public 
funds?”  
• “Are public funds misappropriated by ministers/public officials for private or party 
political purposes?”  
• “Are there special funds for which there is no accountability?”  
• “Are there general abuses of public resources?”  
• “Is there a professional civil service or are large numbers of officials directly appointed 
by the government?”  
• “Is there an independent body auditing the management of public finances?”  
• “Is there an independent judiciary with the power to try ministers/public officials for 
abuses?” 
• “Is there a tradition of payment of bribes to secure contracts and gain favours?” 
Scores were given as integers on a scale from 0, indicating a very low incidence of corruption, to 
4, indicating a very high incidence of corruption. This assessment scored 144 countries or 
territories.  
 Freedom House Nations in Transit asked their experts to explore a range of indicative 
corruption themed questions, including:  
• “Has the government implemented effective anti-corruption initiatives?” 
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• “Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration 
requirements, and other controls that increase opportunities for corruption?” 
• “Are there adequate laws requiring financial disclosure and disallowing conflict of 
interest?” 
• “Does the government advertise jobs and contracts?” 
• “Does the state enforce an effective legislative or administrative process—particularly 
one that is free of prejudice against one’s political opponents—to prevent, investigate, 
and prosecute the corruption of government officials and civil servants?” 
• “Do whistleblowers, anti-corruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy legal 
protections that make them feel secure about reporting cases of bribery and corruption?” 
These scores ran from 1, the lowest level of corruption, to 7, the highest level of corruption, with 
half and quarter intermediate scores allowed (e.g. 3.25). The assessment was done over 29 
countries and territories, including Central Europe and Newly Independent States (NIS).  
 Global Insight Country Risk Ratings provide data scores from 203 countries/territories 
worldwide. They have assessments from over 100 in-house country specialists, who also receive 
expert opinions from in-country freelancers, clients and other contacts. They qualitatively assess 
a broad range of corrupt activity, such as petty bribery to high-level political corruption. The 
experts were asked to assess: ‘Corruption, particularly as it affects operational activities for 
businesses. There was an analytical emphasis on the economic and political drivers of the 
problem.’ ‘From a business perspective, corruption is a particular concern in relation to obtaining 
business permits and favourable policy and planning decisions. Analysts will closely assess 
businesses’ experience of these processes.’ The scores ranged from a minimum of 1.0, minimum 
corruption, to 5.0, maximum corruption, with the possibility for half-point intermediate scores 
(e.g. 3.5).  
 The IMD World Competitiveness Year Book surveyed senior business leaders who 
reflected a cross-section of a nation’s corporate community on corruption. They were asked the 
following question: “Bribing and corruption: Exists or do not exists”. Scores ranged on a 1 to 6 
scale, which was then converted to a 0 to 10 scale where 0 is the highest level of perceived 
corruption and 10 is the lowest. 4200 responded in 2012 covering 59 countries and territories 
around the world.  
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 The Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide produces risk ratings for 
140 countries and territories on a monthly basis. Their corruption question was stated as follows: 
“This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. The most common form of 
corruption met directly by businesses is financial corruption in the form of demands for special 
payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessments, police protection, or loans. The measure is most concerned with actual or potential 
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, exchange of favours, 
secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.” They scored 
corruption on a scale of 0, highest potential risk, to 6, lowest potential risk.  
 The Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey contains a survey of business 
executives in 30 countries and territories around the world. Their survey from 2011, conducted 
on 100 business executives, through phone, face-to-face, and online interviews. Respondents 
were asked the following questions on corruption: “In your opinion, how common is it for public 
officials to demand or accept bribes in this country?” and “In your opinion, how common is the 
misuse of public funds for private gain in this country?” The scores were given on a scale of 1 to 
5 on both questions, where 1 corresponds to “never”, and 5 corresponds to “very common”.  
 The World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment rate corruption with help 
from a staff of experts. The experts were asked to assess the following: Transparency, 
Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector. “This criterion assesses the extent to which 
the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and the results of its actions by the 
electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within 
the executive are required to account for the use of resources, administrative decisions, and 
results obtained. Both levels of accountability are enhanced by transparency in decision making, 
public audit institutions, access to relevant and timely information, and public and media 
scrutiny. A high degree of accountability and transparency discourages corruption, or the abuse 
of public office for private gain. National and sub-national governments should be appropriately 
weighted. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) accountability of the 
executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance; (b) access of 
civil society to information on public affairs; and (c) state capture by narrow vested interests.” 
The scores ranged from 1, low levels of transparency, to 6, high levels of transparency, and it 
allowed for half-point intermediate scores (e.g. 3.5). The CPIA covered 78 countries. 
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 The World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey surveys business executives over 
140 economies. Respondents were asked the following: “In your country, how common is it for 
firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with the following: a) Imports 
and exports; b) Public Utilities; c) Annual Tax Payments; d) Awarding of public contracts and 
licensing; e) Obtaining favourable judicial decisions.” They were also asked: “In your country, 
how common is diversion of public funds to companies, individuals or groups due to 
corruption?” The questions were scored by respondents on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means “very 
common”, and 7 means “never”. Results of a) to e) were aggregated into a single score, and the 
results of both questions were averaged across all respondents to score every country/territory.  
 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index provide data from questions asked of local 
experts and respondents from the general population. They were asked 68 questions on the extent 
to which the government use public office for private gain. The questions touched on a variety of 
sectors within government, including the public health system, regulatory agencies, the police, 
and the courts. Individual questions were aggregated into four sub-indices: 
• Government officials in the executive branch do not use public office for private gain 
• Government officials in the judicial branch do not use public office for private gain 
• Government officials in the police and the military do not use public office for private 
gain 
• Government officials in the legislature do not use public office for private gain 
Scores were given on a continuous scale from a low of 0 to a high of 1. 97 countries were scored 
in 2012.  
When merging the different scores, each source is standardised to be made compatible 
with other available sources, into the CPI scale. The standardisation coverts all data sources to a 
scale of 0-100 where 0 is the highest level of perceived corruption, and 100 is the lowest level of 
perceived corruption. Any of the sources scaled such that lower scores represent lower levels of 
corruption are reversed. Standardisation means subtracting the mean of the data and dividing by 
the standard deviation.  
 Northern European (Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland) countries top the 
list along with Switzerland and the Netherlands, they are all above 80 points on the CPI (Figure 
1). They are followed by mostly Western European countries, which lie between about 70 and 80 
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points on the CPI. Some Southern European countries follow at around the mid 60 scores 
(Cyprus, Spain, and Portugal), with some Eastern European countries and Israel around the 60-
score point. Towards the bottom of the list we see a mix of Southern and Eastern European 
countries, notably at the bottom we find Greece (36), Russia (28), and Ukraine (26) (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: European countries (ESS) ranged on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2012 from 
Transparency International, from least corrupt to most corrupt (100 = minimal corruption, 0 = very 











































































There are, however, criticisms which can be targeted at the CPI. First of all, it might be 
biased as it is derived from self-reported data by people working for multinational firms and 
institutions. These are described as experts and business executives in Transparency 
Internationals methodology.  
What, specifically, the Corruption Perceptions Index is measuring can be discussed, as 
one number ranging from 0-100 is supposed to capture an incredibly complex phenomena can be 
problematic (Wedel 2015). An issue with some of the sources used in the CPI is that the 
respondents are asked to report the extent of a phenomena referred to in the form of broad and 
abstract concept. What exactly it is measuring depends on what those who are reporting are 
defining corruption to be, and who they view as possible to commit corrupt behaviour. We know 
that culturally, corruption is very different in crossing national lines, and what is viewed by a 
European as corrupt, might be a completely normal affair to, for example, developing nations 
(Gardiner 2007). Addressing this we have focused on one continent, Europe (including Israel), so 
to attempt to capture roughly similar attitudes and understandings of the concept of “corruption”. 
It is still important to emphasise that the citizens in a nation might not have the same 
understanding or reality to corruption to those who report it in the CPI.  
Let us also address the idea of people’s perception of corruption as a good measurement 
of actual corruption. Is it viable to give credence to respondents’ self-reported perception of the 
concept of corruption, or in other words, how can we be sure that actual experienced corruption 
correlates with perceived corruption? The defence for the use of perceived corruption can be 
derived from Gonzalez et al. (2019) which we have previously been through in the literature 
review. They bridge the gap between perceived corruption and experienced corruption and argue 
it is either a part of everyday life or it very much is not. This is to say that people are either very 
inundated with corrupt behaviour in their everyday life, and as such report perceived corruption 
to be high, presumably. Contrast to this, people living in countries with low amounts of 
experienced corruption will report low amounts of corruption. In some cases, however, 
respondents might report corruption to be a bigger issue than it is in actuality because they 
experience something outside of their everyday life – for example being asked for a bribe when 
this is not the norm of their society.  
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Pollack & Allern (2018) note several large-scale bribery scandals conducted by 
Scandinavian telecommunication corporations in Uzbekistan. This might show an issue with 
measurements of corruption, as it may not fully take into account that international corporations 
located in (and partly owned by) the least corrupt countries in the world are actors who use 
corrupt cultures in other countries.   
 
 
Population data on corruption 
 
The European Social Survey has collected survey data on several topics every second year since 
2002. The ESS uses a source questionnaire consisting of a collection of questions which can be 
classified into two main parts – a core section and a rotating section. The core section contains 
items measuring a range of topics of enduring interests to the social sciences as well as the most 
comprehensive set to background variables of any cross-national survey. How many items can 
change between rounds, but each question has a unique variable name to assist users working 
with data over time. 
 The rotating sections of the European Social Survey select multi-national teams of 
researchers to contribute to the design of two rotating modules for the questionnaire containing 
up to 30 items each. Rotating modules are selected following an open invite for submissions of 
applications on what the modules of questions are to be fielded as part of a round. Each rotating 
module covers a single academic and/or policy concern within Europe and is drafted by a 
competitively selected team. The rotating modules can contain new modules or repeat ones in 
order to compare with previous ESS rounds.  
 Data collection in the European Social Survey is done via face-to-face computer-assisted 
personal interviewing (CAPI). In each country, the national funding agency appoints a National 
Coordinator (NC) and a survey organisation to implement the survey according to the common 
ESS specification. The Specification is set to ensure the accuracy of data in each country and to 
optimise comparability of data across countries. The most important standards on data collection 
include: 
• Response rate target 70% (as a general target; actual target lower in some countries) 
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• Non-contact rate target of 3% maximum 
• Fieldwork period of at least 6 weeks within the 5 months between September of the 
survey year and January of the following year 
• Detailed briefing of interviewers in face-to-face sessions 
• Restricted interviewer workload (maximum 48 sample units gross) 
• Interviewer call schedule: 4 contacts attempts minimum, among which at least 1 in the 
evening and 1 at the weekend 
• Contact forms to record and document data on fieldwork processes 
• Quality control back-checks on completed interviews and ineligible cases 
• Close monitoring of fieldwork progress 
 
This analysis includes data from the first seven rounds of data, collected from 2002 to 
2015. All analyses presented here include all respondents aged 20 to 70 years.  
 Because some of the phenomena investigated in these data are correlated with the 
respondents’ age (i.e., older people have more time to watch and read news), we have adjusted 
all variables for the age-composition of the countries. First, we have used linear regression 
models with a linear age covariate and random effects for the countries. Then, we have added the 
mean value (at the level of individuals) to the country level random effects. The age-adjusted and 
non-adjusted data are closely correlated with r-statistics typically higher than 0.99 at the level of 
countries. This method corresponds to correcting for linear age in so-called multi-level methods 





As people hear about corruption in media and other reports, there is the possibility that they 
perceive corruption to be a bigger issue than it might actually be. People who never personally 
experience corruption can still report high levels of corruption. To check for this potential bias, 
we use people’s reporting of experienced corruption in the European Social Survey round 2  
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from 2004-05. This bias could be important, as high levels of perceived corruption can have 
policy implications, as noted by Masters & Graycar (2015). 
The second round of the European Social Survey collected in 2004-05 had a special 
module for economic morality. It includes several items related to corruption. The questionnaires 
used several items including items on experiences of corruption, trust in public officials, and 
attitudes toward corruption.  
The item on experiences asked: “How often, if ever, have each of these things happened 
to you in the last five years?” including … “A public official asked you for a favour or a bribe in 
return for a service”, with five possible responses: “Never” (1), “Once” (2), “Twice (3), “3 or 4 
times” (4), “5 times or more” (5), plus “(Don’t know)” (set to missing).  
Being asked for a bribe is a rare phenomenon in the majority of the European countries. 
In eight of the 25 countries investigated, only one such request had been made per 100 
respondents over the previous five years, given that they have a mean value of approximately 
1.01 in the ESS data (Figure 2.1). The Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish respondents reported 
two to three such requests per 100 respondents over the five years. The mean value among the 25 
countries is 11 requests for bribery per 100 respondents (Table 2). Only seven countries had 
responses above that level, and they are all in the Eastern part of continent geographically, even 
though not necessarily in terms of the historically important political east-west divide: Greece 
(geographically but not politically), Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine. Ukraine 
stands out with 72 requests for bribery per 100 respondents, more than two-and-a-half times as 
many as the second most corrupt country according to this indicator, Slovakia with 27 similar 
requests.    
The item on trust was “How much would you trust the following groups to deal honestly 
with people like you?” including … “Public officials”, with five possible responses ranging 
from: “Distrust a lot” (1), “Distrust” (2), “Neither trust nor distrust” (3), “Trust” (4), “Trust a lot” 
(5), plus “(Don’t know)” (set to missing).  
The age-adjusted country-level mean values vary from 2.6 (between “neither-nor” and 
“trust”) to 3.6 (between “trust” and “trust a lot”). Norway is on the top (Figure 2.1) and again, 
Ukraine on the bottom. The difference between Ukraine and some of the other countries is much 
smaller on the item on trust (Figure 1) than on the previous item on having been asked for a bribe 
(Figure 2.1). The mean value for the 25 countries is 3.2. Hence, we can conclude that a lot more 
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people trust than do not trust public officials in Europe. Still, the balance is more even in some 
countries than on others. As for bribes, respondents in the Eastern part of Europe report less trust 
than in the Western part of the continent. There are exceptions, however. The UK, with the 
second-lowest incidence of bribes (Figure 1), is among the countries where the general 
population express low trust toward public officials (Figure 2.1). In contrast, Slovakia with the 
second-highest incidence of bribes (Figure 1) is among the countries where many people report 
high levels of trust in public officials (Figure 2.1). 
The last item was investigated to find out how wrong respondents felt being asked for a 
bribe was “How wrong, if at all, do you consider the following ways of behaving to be? How 
wrong is … a public official asking someone for a favour or bribe in return for their services?”, 
with five possible responses: “Not wrong at all” (1), “A bit wrong” (2), “Wrong” (3), “Seriously 
wrong” (4), plus “(Don’t know)” (set to missing). 
On the item of how wrong respondents find bribery to be, the age-adjusted country-level 
mean values vary from approximately 3.4 and 3.8 (both between “wrong” and “seriously 
wrong”). This suggests that most people in Europe find bribery to be an unjust act. On top of the 
list is Denmark, and once again with Ukraine at the bottom. At the bottom we find two countries 
which were on top for incidences of bribery (Figure 2.1), Ukraine and Slovakia. Hence, it 
appears that having a greater chance of being asked for a bribe might minimize the reaction to 
being asked, as indicated by people responding to bribery not being as wrong. There is the 
possibility that causality runs in the opposite direction as well, that liberal attitudes toward 
corruption make it easier to be corrupt. It is not a huge stretch to assume that corruption is widely 
viewed as a bad thing (Bukovansky 2002). Although there is evidence to suggest Eastern Europe 
are more ok with bribes than Western and Northern Europe, there are exceptions here as well. At 
the top there are mostly Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Finland (Figure 2.3). 
At the bottom there are mostly Eastern European countries: Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, and 
Estonia (Figure 2.3). One exception is the third bottom European country, France (Figure 2.3), 
which is also on the third bottom spot for being asked for a bribe (Figure 2.1). In contrast we find 
Poland as the fifth highest country thinking bribery is wrong (Figure 2.3), but as the fourth 
highest country with incidences of bribery (Figure 2.1) and on the bottom portion of trusting 
public officials (Figure 2.2).  








Trust in Public 
Officials 
25 3.19 .24 2.64 3.58 
Been Asked for a 
Bribe 
25 1.1 .15 1.01 1.72 
How Wrong is 
Bribery? 
25 3.64 .11 3.4 3.83 
 
Figure 2.1: Respondents from European countries answering that they have been asked for a bribe from a 
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Corruption perception and experience correlation 
 
There is a strong correlation between what business elites and experts assess (CPI) and what 
regular people reporting experiences of corruption (asked for a bribe) (r = 0.80, Table 3). These 
scores also correlate well with trust in public officials (r = 0.71 and 0.70). Attitudes to corruption 
also correlate as one would expect, but these attitudes are not always clearly related to 
perceptions (CPI) and experiences of corruption or to the trust in public officials.  
The strong correlation (r = -0.80) (Table 3) between corruption reported by business 
elites in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and corruption reported by regular people in the 
ESS (being asked for a bribe) shows evidence of similarities in the reports of corruption at the 
level of countries. People, whether they be international businesspeople or regular citizens, can 
recognize corruption in its form and to report on it with reasonable accuracy. If a country has had 
many reported incidents of bribery extractions from public officials, the Corruption Perception 
Index will likely be lower than when there was reported few incidents of bribery. In support for 
this type of consistency, we find some of the best scoring CPI countries, including Northern 
European countries such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, plus the Netherlands and 
Switzerland (Figure 3.1). These countries have excellent scores on the Corruption Perception 
Index, and they also have few incidents of bribery requests from public officials compared to the 
rest of Europe. In contrast, countries like Greece, Turkey, and Hungary, have poor ratings on the 
CPI, but they also have relatively low incidents of bribery reported by the general population. 
Ukraine stands out, having the poorest score on corruption perception and the highest incidents 
of bribery of all the countries. Still, compared to other countries, they have more incidents of 
bribery reported by the general population than their corruption perception index suggests. There 
is the possibility that such apparent inconsistencies between corruption reported by business 
people and other elites versus the general population reflect that corruption takes different forms 
in different parts of Europe. If so, in Ukraine, corrupt officials tend to abuse the general 
population rather than the business environment. In contrast, in countries like Greece, Turkey, 
and Hungary, corrupt officials tend to take advantage of the business environment. The 
correlation between business elite’s corruption assessment and regular people’s reporting of their 
trust in public officials has a strong positive correlation (r = 0.71) (Table 3). The finding suggests 
that people’s belief that public officials are more trustworthy with when corruption perception 
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assessments made by the business elites in their country. Notable exceptions in this correlation 
are Ukraine, Greece, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, Hungary, and Austria. 
These countries are interesting since they are all from different geographical locations across the 
European continent. However, many of the Eastern European countries are represented, 
suggesting they have more trust in public officials than the corruption perceptions would allow 
(Figure 3.2). Contrary, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland are all represented as 
having a high corruption perceptions score (meaning clean of corruption), but not trusting their 
public officials to the extent of which the correlation would suggest.  
There is a high negative correlation between the experience of regular people being asked 
for a bribe and their trust in public officials (r = -0.70) (Table 3). This suggests being asked for a 
bribe is viewed by those experiencing it as a negative experience, lowering their trust in public 
officials in general. Two countries are especially noticeable outliers in this correlation: Ukraine 
and the UK (Figure 3.4). Ukraine stands out by having the most people being asked for a bribe 
(1.7), but still having a relatively hight trust in public officials (2.6), even though it is the lowest 
of all countries involved. The UK on the other hand is an outlier for being low on average trust in 
public officials (2.9) when having very few bribery incidents (1.0).  
The causal relationship between trust in public officials and the prevalence of corruption 
may work both ways. The most plausible explanation might be that widespread corruption tears 
down the trust in public officials. But we can also imagine that high trust can be abused by 
public officials. Having low trust in public officials could be a mechanism for keeping them in 
check, perhaps that is what is happening in the UK (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4). Going further 
with this, perhaps high trust in public officials in Slovakia could have made it easier for public 
officials to exploit their position to their own advantage (they had high prevalence). It is possible 
that these differences may be related to the fact that the UK is an old democracy and that 
Slovakia is a relatively young democracy in a European context. 
For the correlation between business elite’s perception of corruption and regular people’s 
trust in public officials there is a moderate positive correlation, though not as strong as the 
previous variables (r = 0.61) (Table 3). Countries with people thinking bribery is increasingly 
wrong will have a higher corruption cleanliness, though there are many exceptions here. Ukraine, 
Greece, Turkey, Czech Republic, and Poland are all outliers, having more people respond that 
bribery is wrong according to their corruption perception score. In contrast, France, Switzerland, 
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Sweden, and Finland are on the other side, having less people thinking bribery is wrong than 
their corruption perception score would suggest. (Figure 3.3). 
 When checking correlation between regular people’s assessment of how wrong bribery is 
and people’s experience of being asked for a bribe there is a moderate negative correlation (r = -
0.53) (Table 3). Being asked for a bribe could be related to people thinking it is less of a 
problem. If people are met with petty corruption every day, they might not see it as much of an 
issue. Countries where being asked for a bribe is a rarity (example Denmark) might develop high 
moral stances on bribery.  
 On people assessing how wrong bribery is and their trust in public officials there is a 
weak positive correlation (r = 0.39) (Table 3). A normative/moral stance on how wrong 
corruption is does not seem to have a large impact how much people trust their public officials to 
deal honestly with them.  
 




for a Bribe 
Trust in Public 
Officials 
How Wrong is 
Bribery? 
CPI 2012 1.00    
Been Asked for a Bribe -0.80 1.00   
Trust in Public Officials 0.71 -0.70 1.00  











Figure 3.1: Corruption perception and being asked for a bribe, presented as a scatterplot with a regression 
line (r = -0.80). N = 25  
 














Figure 3.2: Correlation between corruption perception and trust in public officials, presented as a 
















Figure 3.3: Correlation between corruption perception and how wrong respondents think bribery is, 















Figure 3.4: Correlation between respondents being asked for a bribe and trust in public officials, 

















The principle explanatory variable, hypothesised to limit corruption, is an active civil society 
which is following news and current affairs in the media. The European Social Survey includes 
questions covering several aspects of civic engagement including people’s behaviour following 
news and current affairs, and respondents’ interest in politics. First, we use data from European 
Social Survey rounds 4 and 5 to compare with CPI 2012. Then, we use the same questions about 
news from ESS rounds 1 and 2 to compare with corruption experience from ESS round 2.  
 We investigate the correlation between the rounds for the variables (Table 4.3). 
Following news and current affairs in the ESS rounds 1-2 and 4-5 correlate strongly with each 
other (r = 0.86). The percentage not following the news or current affairs from ESS rounds 1-2 
and 4-5 also have a strong correlation (r = 0.91). Deviations from perfect correlations can have a 
few reasons. One reason in measurement error when estimating the news and current affairs 
between samples of typically 1500 respondents from each country for each wave. Another reason 
can be that how far people follow the news and current affairs changes differently between 
countries.  
 
News and current affairs 
 
To measure civil society’s engagement regarding behaviour which intends to combat or foster 
corrupt behaviour in public officials, we attempt to use people’s actual behaviour. This means we 
have measures of individuals’ self-reported following of news and public affairs. European 
Social Survey (ESS) have conducted several surveys with the topic of media use in their 
questionnaires. Here we use data from rounds 4 and 5 (2008-2009 and 2010-2011), section A on 
media. The questions were similarly phrased in both rounds.  
The first item on media usage asked, “On an average weekday, how much time, in total, 
do you spend watching television?” with the eight possible response, starting with: “No time at 
all”,  and followed by “Less than ½ hour”, “½ hour to 1 hour”, etc. “ 
Those responding spending some time (“Less than ½ hour” or more but not “No time at 
all” were asked the following question: “And again on an average weekday, how much of your 
time watching television is spent watching news or programmes about politics and current 
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affairs7?” There were eight possible responses: “No time at all”, “Less than ½ hour”, “½ hour to 
1 hour”, “More than 1 hour, up to 1½ hours”, “More than 1½ hours, up to 2 hours”, “More than 2 
hours, up to 2½ hours”, “More than 2½ hours, up to 3 hours”, “More than 3 hours”, plus “(Don’t 
know)” (set to missing).  
 Similar sets of questions were also asked about time spent listing to the radio and time 
spent reading newspapers, with introductory questions about total time. Then, eight possible 
responses for the time spend listing to new current affairs for both the radio and newspapers 
respectively. Hence, we have scaled measures for the time spent on news and current affairs for 
three different media platforms: television, radio, and newspapers.  
We constructed a summary index for the three media platforms indicating total time spent 
following news and current affairs on the three media platforms. The index ranges from 0 – 10 
with half an hour intervals of time spent on news and current affairs in the three media platforms. 
Example: 0 = no time at all, 1 = less than ½ hour, 2 = ½ hour to 1 hour, 3 = 1 hour to 1½ hours, 
etc. Because a small number of respondents spend very much time following news and current 
affairs, we set this time to a maximum of approximately five hours per day (as indicated by 10 or 
higher on the index, corresponding to 2.4% of the sample).  
Time spent following news and current affairs is correlated with age as older people have 
more time to spend on such activities than younger adults (r = 0.25). We do not believe that older 
people represent more critical civic engagement because they spend more time watching the 
news and current affairs. We believe that the correlation with age merely reflects that older 
people have more time available for such activities. Hence, when calculating the mean values for 
the countries, we adjust these mean values for the possibility that the age composition also 
affects country-level comparison using the same random effects models as we did for our 
dependent variables (incidence of bribery, thrust toward public officials, how wrong is bribery) 
estimated in the ESS. We used a linear term with age and random effects for the countries, and 
we adjusted the latter with its mean value at the level of individuals. We then aggregated the 
individual-level data (N = 85.000) to country-level data (N = 29). The age-adjusted and non-
adjusted mean levels for the 29 countries are still highly correlated (r > 0.99).  
 
 
7 European Social Survey defines «politics and current affairs» as: «about issues to do with governance and public 
policy, and with the people connected with these affairs.» 
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When comparing European countries following the news and current affairs, the age-
adjusted country-level mean values vary from 2.57 (2.57 * 30 minutes = up to 77 minutes) to 4.9 
(up to 147 minutes) (Table 4.1). The mean for all 29 European countries on following news and 
current affairs is 3.72 (up to 112 minutes a day following news and current affairs) (Table 4.1). 
There are 16 countries below the mean level, mostly featuring Eastern and Southern parts of 
Europe, except Switzerland and the UK. The 13 countries above the mean level mostly contain 
Western and Northern geographically located European countries, with the exceptions of Poland, 
Romania, and Estonia. Israel is also represented above the mean level, but is not geographically a 
part of Europe. Norway, Ireland, Estonia, and Denmark have the highest amount of people 
following news and current affairs in Europe on average, all above two hours or more time spent 
(Figure 4.1). Norway is on top with a mean of 4.9, with Ireland, Estonia, and Denmark following 
with means of 4.65, 4.65, and 4.63, respectively (Figure 4.1). At the bottom is Greece, with a 
mean of 2.57, with Russia at the second lowest with a mean of 2.88 (Figure 4.1). The third 
lowest country on the means of following news and current affairs is Ukraine, with a mean of 
3.15 (Figure 4.1).  
 
 
Using the same data from ESS about news and current affairs we also construct an index of 
people not following any news or current affairs. We create a percentage measure for those who 
almost do not follow news measured as less than half an hour per day from all three media 
platforms. The same adjustment is done for age here as with following news and current affairs 
for the possibility that the age composition affects country-level comparison using the random 
effects models estimated in the ESS. We also aggregated the individual-level data (N = 85.000) 
to country-level data (N = 29) for this variable. The age-adjusted and non-adjusted mean levels 
for the 29 countries are still highly correlated (r > 0.99). 
 The age-adjusted country-level mean values vary from 5.5 per cent to 38 per cent of the 
adult population not following the news or current affairs (Table 4.1). Greece is on top with 38 
per cent, and Norway is at the bottom with 5.5 per cent (Figure 4.2). In Greece, much more 
people are not follow the news or current affairs than the second highest country; Russia with 
27.5 per cent, making them almost 10 percentage points from each other. The mean for all 
European countries is 17 per cent (Table 4.1). Northern European countries, Norway, Denmark, 
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Finland, and Sweden all have comparatively low percentages of their population not following 
news (Figure 4.2). However, though there is some variance between Norway’s 5.5 per cent and 
Sweden’s 9.7, with Denmark and Finland in between (6.36 and 7.76 per cent, respectively). 
Estonia also has a comparatively low percentage of people not following news (7.84) (Figure 
4.2). These countries are also represented in the top of the list for people following news and 
current affairs (Figure 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1: Sum of observed European countries’ following news and current affairs and those who do not 
follow the news or current affairs. N = 29 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
News 29 3.72 0.56 2.57 4.9 
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Because we will compare experienced corruption with news consumption, we also collected data 
on news and current affairs from the European Social Survey rounds 1 and 2 (2002-05). This was 
done because the data on corruption experience from the ESS was only available in one of the 
rotating modules for round 2 on economic morality. The items on the news and current affairs 
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were collected in the same way for rounds 1 and 2 as rounds 4 and 5 - individuals’ self-reported 
following of news and public affairs.  
 We adjusted the mean values for the countries for the possibility that the age composition 
affects country-level comparisons using the same random effects model we used for news and 
current affairs in rounds 4-5. We also used a linear term with age and random effects for the 
countries, and we adjusted the latter with its mean value at the level of individuals. We then 
aggregated the individual-level data (N = 73.000) to country-level data (N = 27). The age-
adjusted and non-adjusted mean levels for the 27 countries are still highly correlated (r > 0.99).  
  
 When comparing European countries following the news and current affairs in the ESS 
rounds 1 and 2, the age-adjusted country-level mean values vary from 2.83 (up to 85 minutes) to 
5.21 (up to 156 minutes) (Table 4.2). The mean for all 27 European countries on following news 
and current affairs is 4.11 (up to 123 minutes a day following news and current affairs) (Table 
4.2). All these values are higher for rounds 1 and 2, than rounds 4 and 5 of the ESS (Table 4.2 
and 4.1). This finding suggests that people spend more time following the news and current 
affairs in 2002-2005 than they did a few years before in 2008-2011. It supports the argument that 
news following goes down over time (Aalberg et al. 2013).  
There are 13 countries above the mean level, mostly Western and Northern European 
countries, with the exceptions of Ukraine and Estonia. Israel is again also represented above the 
mean level. The top countries, Norway, Ireland, Denmark, and Israel all have above 140 minutes 
following news and current affairs (Figure 4.3). Norway is on top with a mean of 5.21 (up to 156 
minutes following the news), with Ireland, Denmark, and Israel following with means of 4.81, 
4.79, and 4.7, respectively (Figure 4.3). The United Kingdom is right on the mean level (4.11). 
There are 13 countries under the mean level, mostly contained to Eastern and Southern Europe, 
with France, Switzerland, and Belgium as exceptions. At the bottom is Greece with a mean of 
2.83 (up to 85 minutes). The second lowest country is Italy with a mean of 3.62 (up to 109 
minutes). Interestingly, Ukraine has a mean of 4.34 (up to 130 minutes a day), compared to ESS 
rounds 4-5 where they had 3.15 (up to 95 minutes a day).  
 
 Using the same data from ESS 1-2 about news and current affairs we construct an index 
of people not following any news or current affairs. We create a percentage measure for those 
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who almost do not follow news measured as less than half an hour per day from all three media 
platforms. The same adjustment is done for age here as with following news and current affairs 
for the possibility that the age composition affects country-level comparison using the random 
effects models estimated in the ESS. We also aggregated the individual-level data (N = 73.000) 
to country-level data (N = 27) for this variable. The age-adjusted and non-adjusted mean levels 
for the 27 countries are still highly correlated (r > 0.99).  
 The age-adjusted country-level mean values vary from 2.06 per cent to 28.79 per cent of 
the population not following news or current affairs (Table 4.2). The mean for all European 
countries is 10.73 per cent (Table 4.2). There are 15 countries above the mean, mostly belonging 
to Eastern and Southern geographically located European countries, but also a few Western 
European countries: Ireland, the UK, Belgium and France. The 12 countries below the mean 
mostly contain the geographical North or Western Europe, except for of Estonia and Poland. 
Greece is on top with 28.79 (Table 4.2) per cent of people responding they did not follow any 
news or current affairs (Figure 4.4). The second highest country is Turkey with a mean of 22.44 
per cent, followed by Spain with 18.33 per cent of people not following news and current affairs. 
At the bottom is Norway, with a mean of 2.06 per cent (Table 4.2). All the other Northern 
European countries follow Norway from the bottom up, starting with Finland, Denmark, 
Sweden, and then Iceland (Figure 4.4).  
 
Table 4.2: Sum of observed European countries’ following news and current affairs and those who do not 
follow news or current affairs. N = 27 
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Table 4.3: Correlation between all news measures, from the ESS rounds 4-5 (2008-2010), and rounds 1-2 
(2002-2004). N = 23 
 News  
2008-10 




No News  
2002-04 
News 2008-10 1.00    
No News 2008-10 -0.78 1.00   
News 2002-04  0.86 -0.61 1.00  
No News 2002-04 -0.70  0.91 -0.72 1.00 
 
 
When using self-reported data on news exposure it is important to mention that these can 
be over-exaggerated (Prior 2009). People might respond that they watch much more news than 
they actually do, perhaps because it is hard to remember exactly how many minutes and hours 
they spend watching the news and current affairs. People might also want to report high levels of 
news exposure, as it is regarded as “positive social behaviour” to follow news and current affairs 
(Ringdal 2014). However, the questions in European Social Survey are asked in such a way to 
attempt to counter this by asking first about regular media usage, such as ‘how many hours do 
you spend watching television/listening to radio/reading newspapers’. Watching television can 
be argued to be seen as negative social behaviour and might therefore be under-reported. Radio 
and newspapers are perhaps more nuanced. Nevertheless, believing that the European Social 















Civic engagement also includes political interest. The European Social Survey rounds 4-7 (2008-
2014) included items on political interest, efficacy, trust, electoral and other forms of 
participation, party allegiance, socio-political orientations”. The item on political interest was 
phrased exactly the same way in all rounds 4 to 7: “How interested would you say you are in 
politics – are you…” Four response categories varied from “very interested”, “quite interested”, 
“hardly interested”, and “not at all interested?”, plus “(don’t know)” (set to missing).  
We compare how many people who answered “not at all interested” in politics and 
present them as a percentage of the respondents from each country by aggregating the individual-
level data (N = 31.900) to country-level data (N = 31) (Table 5.1). Again, we adjust for the age 
composition of the countries among respondents between the age of 20 and 70. We removed 
those who answered “don’t know” on being interested in politics from these calculations. Then 
we adjust the percentage of those with no interest in politics for a linear age term in linear 
regression models with random effects for the countries. As this analysis focuses on countries 
and not individuals, we merged the data from individuals to countries.  
 
 Political interest very a lot between European countries. Those not at all interested in 
politics vary from 3.5 per cent to 35.2 per cent of the adult populations (Table 5.1). On top is 
Portugal (Figure 5), with 35.2 per cent of their adult population not at all interested in politics, 
followed by Greece, Croatia, and Turkey. At the bottom we find Denmark with 3.5 per cent 
(Figure 5), with Germany, Norway, and Sweden just above. The mean for all the countries is 
18.7 (Table 5.1), with 12 countries above it, all either geographically Eastern European or 
Southern European countries, except for Israel and Ireland. Interestingly, Ukraine and Russia are 
slightly below the mean (Table 5.1) with 17.9 and 17.7 per cent, respectively. This is notable, as 
these two countries have been located either at the top or bottom of every other result so far (for 







Table 5.1: Summary of individuals and countries who are not interested in politics.   
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No Interest 
(Individuals) 
31900 17.58 38.1 0 100 
No Interest 
(Countries) 
31 18.72 9.08 3.53 35.17 
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There is a high correlation between media use and political interest (Table 5.2). Not following 
news and having no political interest correlates at 0.74. There is a strong negative correlation 
between following news and not following news (r = -0.81), which also makes sense. Following 
news and having no political interest has a more moderate negative correlation (r = -0.60). This 
seems also sensible, seeing as people with no political interest would likely not be interested in 
watching the news or current affairs. However, since news are not necessarily always political, 
so even if people are not interested in politics, they still might want to follow other forms of 
news and current affairs. 
 
Table 5.2: Correlation between following news and current affairs, not following news and current affairs, 
and having no political interest at all. ESS rounds 4-5 for news, rounds 4-7 for political interest. N 
= 27 
 Time Following News Not Following News No Political Interest 
Time Following News 1.00   
Not Following News -0.81 1.00  




















Civic engagement and corruption 
 
We have hypothesised that civic engagement will curb corruption. We investigate this hypothesis 
by investigating the correlations between measures of corruption and measures of civic 
engagement. First, we will investigate bivariate correlations, and later we will also investigate 
some multivariate correlations. The latter is more difficult because both civic engagement and 
corruption are also correlated with other potentially important factors (e.g., wealth and income 
distribution), and linear regression models cannot distinguish between when comparing a 
relatively small number of European countries.  
 
A first issue investigated is the role of time spent watching the news and current affairs for 
halting corruption. We find a positive correlation of 0.64 between the hours spent following the 
news and current affairs in the ESS and the corruption perception index (CPI) of Transparency 
International (Figure 6.1). The graph shows some clusters formed with countries of geographical 
proximity. Greece, Russia, and Ukraine are at the bottom of both the corruption perception index 
(Figure 1) and the time spent following the news and current affairs (Figure 4.1), placing them at 
the bottom of the regression line of our graphical analysis (Figure 6.1). Russia, Ukraine, and 
Romania are outliers, being further up on following news and current affairs relative to their 
corruption perception score. On the lower middle of the regression line, we find mostly Eastern 
European countries: Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Croatia, and Turkey8. 
Hungary and Slovenia are located almost perfectly on the regression line (Figure 6.1). The rest of 
these Eastern European countries score somewhat better on following news and current affairs 
than a perfect correlation would suggest, as do Poland and Israel, but with better scores in each 
variable.  
Contrary to the Eastern European countries, there are three Southern European countries 
relatively good corruption perception scores compared to their news following: Cyprus, Spain, 
and Portugal (Figure 6.1). Southern and Eastern European countries seem to spend about the 
same amount of time following news and current affairs, but they differ in corruption perception. 
The UK, Germany, France, and Belgium (Western European) cluster together with more CPI 
 
8 Although only 3 per cent of Turkey is located in Eastern Europe, with the rest being located in Asia, they are 
members of the EU, NATO, and the European side of Turkey has a population of 10 million people.  
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than their news following would suggest, deviating slightly from the regression line (Figure 6.1). 
Switzerland is also an outlier, with a very high score of corruption perception (86), but middling 
scores of following news and current affairs, on par with Eastern and Southern European 
countries. Mirrored to Switzerland’s score, Romania is an outlier with very high news 
participation scores (4.3, Figure 4.1), but a low corruption perception score (44, Figure 1). 
Ireland and Estonia are represented together with very high news participation, but relatively low 
corruption perception (Figure 6.1). The Northern European countries, together with the 
Netherlands, form the upper echelon of the corruption perception scale (Figure 1), but some 
follow more news than others. Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands have high news 
participation, but with comparatively even better scores on the corruption index. Norway and 
Denmark line up pretty well in these. In conclusion, there seems to be a linear strong linear 
correlation between corruption perception and following news and current affairs in European 
countries (r = 0.64), with Eastern and Southern European generally towards the bottom and 





















Figure 6.1: Comparing European countries’ perception of corruption (CPI) from Transparency 
International (2012) with hours spent watching the news or programmes about politics or current 
affairs ESS rounds 4 and 5 (2008-2010). (r = 0.64). (Turkey and Latvia are on top of each other 
and hard to make out). N = 29 
 
 
The correlation between the corruption perception index and the percentages of people not 
following news and current affairs is even higher (-0.78; Figure 6.2) than the correlation between 
corruption and the time spent on watching the news and current affairs (0.64; Figure 6.1). This 
result suggests that countries with a high percentage of people not following the news could be 
more important for curbing corruption than the time spent following the news. The graph shows 
clearer evidence here (Figure 6.2) for a Northern European cluster than with “following news 
and current affairs” (Figure 6.1). At the top of the regression line, we find Norway, Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden (Figure 6.2). 
 The main deviations from the near-linear relation between the percentage not interested 
in the news and current affairs versus corruption are in the Eastern and Southern Europe. The 
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Eastern European countries have comparatively few people not interested in the news but still a 
relatively poor score on the corruption index. In contrast, the Southern European countries, 
together with the UK and Israel, score comparatively better on the corruption index than they do 
on the percentage not following news. Estonia is one example, with a fairly news interested 
population (Figure 4.1 and 6), similar to many Northern European countries, but still scores 
relatively lower on the corruption perception index (Figure 1). Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine, and 
Russia also follow this deviation, but to different degrees, such as Ukraine and Russia being very 
low on the corruption perception index, but still having the same amounts of people not 
following the news and current affairs as Spain or Israel. An example from the contrasting sides 
outliers is Greece, having the highest percentage of people not following the news or current 
affairs, but with a better corruption perception score than Russia or Ukraine (Figure 6.2).  
 
Figure 6.2: Comparing European countries’ perception of corruption (CPI) with percentages of the 





We find a negative correlation between perceived corruption and percentages of populations that 
are not interested in politics (-0.60; Figure 6.3). There is a linear correlation between the two 
variables, but there are some countries which deviate from our regression line. These countries 
are outliers because of their poor scores on the corruption perception index despite the fact that 
the population in these countries are interested in politics (pushing the regression line down a 
little; Figure 6.3). The clearest examples of this is Ukraine and Russia, and then Italy, Slovakia, 
and Bulgaria. These countries These countries make the correlation between corruption 
perception and political interest lower than for the links between following the news and current 
affairs, and not following news and current affairs (Figure 6.1 and 6.2). 
 Why are these countries, where people claim to be interested in politics, so poorly scored 
on the corruption perception index? One answer may be that it is not enough to be interested in 
politics if you also do not follow news and politics. Perhaps this shows that behaviour is a more 
valid measure of civic engagement than interests and attitudes. Behavioural data can be better 
measures of preferences than attitudinal data, especially when the phenomenon of study is 
socially desirable or associated with costs (time spent), such as being engaged in the news and 
current affairs. There is also a possibility that there is something wrong with the corruption 
















Figure 6.3: Comparing 31 European countries’ perception of corruption with percentages of the 

















Civic engagement and bribery 
 
The previous chapter investigated the relationship between civic engagement and corruption 
using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International. This scale builds 
mostly on the perceptions of business elites. We will now investigate similar relationships 
between corruption as the report of actual requests for bribery in the general population as 
reported in the European Social Survey. We use data on news and current affairs, and on 
corruption experiences, from the European Social Survey rounds 1 and 2 (2002-04).  
 The two indicators on news consumption, the time people spend following the news and 
current affairs and the percentage not following the news were similarly correlated in the ESS 
rounds 1 to 2 (2002-04) (r = -0.79; Table 6) as they were in the ESS rounds 4 and 5 (r = -0.81; 
Table 5.2).  
 There are relatively low correlations between people’s direct experience with bribery 
(asked for a bribe) and how much time they spend following the news (r = -0.14); Table 6) as 
well as with the percentage not following news and current affairs (r = 0.26; Table 6). These 
findings could seem like a surprise given the much higher correlations between news 
consumption and the corruptions perception index among business elites. It appears that 
experiences of bribery are not strongly affected by people following news in a country. However, 
there is the possibility that causality runs both ways. Many people spending time following the 
news and current affairs could lead to less corruption, even in terms of requests for bribery 
toward ordinary people. There is also the possibility that an opposite effect somewhat balances 
this first effect if many requests for corruption lead more people to follow the news and current 
affairs. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that the news and current affairs tend to 
cover corporate and other large-scale corruption scandals in contrast to everyday requests for 
bribery that may go unnoticed in the media.  
 Theory suggests that bribery should lead to lower trust in public officials. The ESS data 
strongly support this hypothesis as the correlation between requests for bribery and trust in 
public officials is as high as -0.70 between the 25 countries participating in the ESS rounds 1-2. 
We believe that this effect is causal because being asked for a bribe by a public official would 




Table 6: Correlation between following news, not following any news, trust that public officials deal 
honestly with you, having been asked for a bribe, and how wrong you think being asked for a 
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This analysis has revealed strong correlations between how far ordinary citizens follow the news 
and current affairs and the corruption perception index from Transparency International. We 
have also found a strong relationship between how far ordinary people have been asked for a 
bribe and how far they trust public officials, even at the level of European countries. Theory 
suggests that these correlations are causal, that an actively watching citizenry following the 
current affairs is likely to reduce the incidence of corruption. Theory also suggests that the 
experiences of requests for bribery are likely to erode trust in public officials and public 
institutions.  
 Our results are, to some extent, driven by a seemingly consistent geographical pattern of 
well-functioning countries in the Northern part of Europe in contrast to the less well-functioning 
countries in the Eastern and Southern pars of Europe. These countries are different concerning 
several other characteristics as well, including national wealth, income distribution, and 
education level. So, the last analysis will investigate how these main results from our empirical 
analyses are consistent for these background variables as well. 
 We have collected data on national wealth using the gross domestic product (GDP), 
income distribution, and education level from the United Nations Human Development Report 
for 20109. The Human Development Report (HDR) creates an index (the Human Development 
Index) for human development from three dimensions and four indicators. The three dimensions 
are health, education, and living standards. The four indicators include life expectancy at birth, 
mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and gross national income per capita. The 
Human Development Report sees these basic dimensions of human development as a 
measurement of the richness of human life, not only the richness of the economy in which the 
people live10.  
 The HDR relies on international data agencies to collect and compile data on their 
specific indicators. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita data is collected by the World 
Bank. The data is converted into purchasing power parity (PPP) to eliminate the difference in 
national price levels so to better compare across countries.  
 
9 The Human Development Report 2010: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf  
10 http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/humandev  
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Data on income distribution are based on data on gross national income (GNI) per capita 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator’s database. Again, to eliminate the 
differences in national price levels, the data is converted into PPP in order to better compare 
standards of living across countries. The GNI estimates were based on price data from the 2005 
International Comparison Program (ICP), covering 146 countries and areas. The World Bank 
gather data on GDP and GNI from reports by the Bank’s country management units and data 
obtained from official sources. 
Data on education levels is based on expected years of schooling from the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. The 
estimates are based on enrolment by age at all levels of education and population of official 
school age for all levels of education by age. Data collection from UNESCO on education is 
done by using information included in the National Reports on the Development of Education, 
with supplements from other data sources.  
 
We have found a clear geographical pattern that North and West European countries have 
more active citizens in that they follow more news and current affairs than citizens in South and 
East Europe. However, these countries also differ in other characteristics, including economic 
development (GDP), income distribution (GNI), and educational levels. The causal order 
between these factors may go several ways. For example, it is possible that the level of education 
affects how many people follow the news and current affairs, and it is possible that the 
distribution of income affects how many who do not bother to follow the news and current 
affairs. Perhaps because they do not feel like full citizens, disregarded from society. It is also 
possible that many of these processes are driven by more general modernization processes.  
  The results of our linear regression analysis show that education levels have surprisingly 
low importance, and that income distribution matters most for the incidence of corruption in the 
CPI (Table 7.1 & 7.2). This finding corresponds with You & Khargram (2005) who argue that 
income inequality increases corruption because inequality creates groups with different interests, 
with the beneficiaries of corruption not wanting change. You & Khargram (2005: 153) argue for 
a reciprocal causation between inequality and corruption, where greater inequality causes higher 
levels of corruption and higher levels of corruption intensifies corruption. It is economic 
conditions (prosperity and distribution) and an alert public that appear to play a major role in 
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reducing corruption (Table 7.1 & 7.2). When it comes to economic conditions (prosperity and 
distribution), we believe that causality can go both ways. There is good reason to believe that 
corruption weakens the economy and produces a more uneven distribution of income (Mauro 
1995; You & Khargram 2005). But there is also reason to believe that a well-functioning 
economy, or factors that are correlated with a well-functioning economy, reduces corruption. 
Treisman (2002) suggests lower economic development, by itself, increases corruption. This is 
done by checking for a correlation between GDP and latitude toward the Equator, since the latter 
cannot be affected by corruption (correlating at 0.69). Treisman (2002) found that latitudinal 
location was significantly related to corruption levels with a coefficient of -0.09, significant at 
the 0.01 level.  
 The correlation between news and current affairs is quite robust when controlling for 
structural characteristics of the countries. In the full model (4), it is on a par with national wealth 
(GDP per capita) when investigated as time spent on news and current affairs (Table 7.1). 
However, when the role of news and current affairs is investigated as the percentage not 
following the news, it is seemingly even more important than national wealth and on a par with 
income distribution (Table 7.2).  
These high correlations between corruption and news and current affairs, on the other 
hand, might be because an active citizenry helps to limit corruption in a society. There is no 
reason to believe that corruption should help people not keep up with news and current affairs. 
High levels of corruption would rather lead more people to follow the news and current affairs, 
based on the theories presented above and common sense.  
 
In our results for the regression analysis between trust in public officials with incidents of 
bribery, education level, national wealth, and income distribution, we can see that being asked 
for a bribe shows much more robust similarities with trust in public officials than the other 
variables (Table 7.3). When controlling for trust in public officials, we find education levels have 
very low importance, while income distribution and national wealth has some explanatory value. 
Still, having been asked for a bribe seem to shape people’s trust in their public officials to the 
greatest degree in the full model (4) (Table 7.3). It seems direct experiences are more valuable to 




Table 7.1: CPI in 2012 related to news and current affairs, education level, national wealth, and income 
distribution. Standardised coefficients. N = 29 
 Bivariate 1 2 3 4 
News & current affairs 0.64** 0.44* 0.28* 0.28*   0.29** 
Education level 0.50** 0.36*   -0.13 
GDP per capita PPP 0.72**    0.71**  0.28* 
Income distribution PPP 0.84**     0.72**   0.56** 
*p < .05; **p < .01  
 
 
Table 7.2: CPI in 2012 related to no news or current affairs, education level, national wealth, and income 
distribution. Standardised coefficients. N = 29 
 Bivariate 1 2 3 4 
No news or current affairs -0.78**  -0.64** -0.43** -0.43**     -0.41** 
Education level  0.50** 0.03*   -0.08 
GDP per capita PPP  0.72**  0.60**  0.25 
Income distribution PPP  0.84**   0.62**   0.46* 
*p < .05; **p < .01  
 
 
Table 7.3: Trust in public officials related to incidents of bribery, education level, national wealth, and 
income distribution. Standardised coefficients. N = 25 
 Bivariate 1 2 3 4 
Been asked for a Bribe -0.70**  -0.76** -0.54** -0.75** -0.72** 
Education level 0.17  0.14   0.07 
GDP per capita PPP  0.58**  0.28  0.49 
Income distribution PPP  0.49*   0.07 -0.44 








Our hypothesis “The incidence of corruption is lower in countries with an active civil society” 
implies that a participating civilian sector is important to lower corruption, or to keep it low in 
any given country. Having a citizenry who keeps up with news and current affairs seem to be a 
better indicator than a more passive interest in politics. 
Figure 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 indicate that use of media might be more important than people’s 
interest in politics for combating/preventing corruption. Following, and not following, news and 
current affairs had higher correlations with corruption than political interest (0.64 and -0.78 
versus -0.60). A possible explanation for this is the measurement technique – people might be 
more inclined to report a higher interest in politics than reported hours following news and 
current affairs. Civic engagement in the form of following news and current affairs might be 
more important than having an interest in politics. Actually taking some form of action in 
following public questions and discussions can be more influential than just having an interest in 
politics – the behaviour trumps the interest. Being able to surveillance officeholders and 
constrain their exercise of power (corrupt behaviour in this case) through media is described as 
political accountability (Camaj 2013). A political actor is beholden to accountability only if he or 
she is caught in corrupt conduct. Thus comes the need for a free media to conduct faithful 
investigations into political actors so their behaviour can be judged and justified. Mass media 
reporting on corrupt behaviour “does arouse the ire of the public, which exercises another form 
of sanction: electoral defeat at the ballot box for a single elected office holder or an entire 
government” (Stapenhurst 2000: 4). But what some studies into medias role on curbing 
corruption fail to mention is if people are actively watching. Even though investigative 
journalists find evidence for corrupt behaviour or laws and regulation which can potentially 
breed corruption – are people hearing about it?  
  Both bivariate (Figure 6.1 and 6.2) and multivariate analyses (Table 7.1 and 7.2) shows 
us the relationship between people’s hours spent following news and current affairs, and the 
proportion of those who do not keep up with the news. These results indicate that numbers of 
people not following the news has a higher correlation with corruption than the number of hours 
spent following the news and current affairs (r = 0.78 and 0.64 respectively in the bivariate 
analyses). These findings suggest that when people are apathetic towards what is going on in 
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news and politics, there could be more possibilities to act corruptly among people in trusted 
positions. 
There are some important changes going on in the media landscape that have been 
pointed out in previous research (Prior 2005; Aalberg et al. 2013). People are choosing not to 
follow news and current affairs, because they have more and more chances to avoid it. The 
ability to follow as much news and current affairs as you want is more prominent than ever 
before, but so is the possibility to completely avoid it. A modern civil society, citizens, being 
capable of communicating their ideas and values in rational conversation, can have an effect on 
public official’s behaviour. With people knowing what is going on around them, being active and 
taking part in civil society, that might stop public officials’ access to corruption. A watching 
citizenry, who act on what they see or hear, can choose to vote out or protest behaviour they 
disagree with, which might be possible if enough people agree with them. Reaching out to the 
masses then becomes a task of the media, who set the agenda of what is to be discussed. It hinges 
on a free press to clearly lay out what issues might persist in modern society so people can 
discuss them.  
The risk of getting caught and punished for corrupt behaviour is the most obvious cost for 
potential corrupt actors (Treisman 2000). The probability to be caught can depend on many 
factors. First of all, as our study suggests, having people participating in the political landscape 
by following what is going on in their country is important for a low corruption perception score. 
The risk of exposure in the media could potentially be a barrier for public officials and 
politicians to stay away from corrupt behaviour – because they know the citizens are watching, 
and that there is a potential for getting in trouble. When public officials lose their job in regards 
to being found guilty on corruption charges, they may experience a variety of reinforced 
deterrents to corruption (Stapenhurst 2000). This may include public humiliation, loss of 
prestige, social standing and income. This may also cause further strengthening among the public 
to continue to act against corruption. Having this happen is reliant on a civil society which acts 
against the acts they perceive as corrupt, or else they would not care. Such perceptions can be 
helped by watching the news – seeing what is going on. Greater civic engagement can lead to 
closer monitoring of corruption, especially if backed by freedom of association and freedom of 
the press (Treisman 2000).  
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There is also the possibility that more news-focused and political shows can use 
entertainment so to attract those interested only in entertainment. Shows such as Fiks Fare give 
us a look at such an idea, displaying satirical everyday corruption in Albania (Musaraj 2018). 
Late-night shows with political jokes are also a possibility, but there could be an issue with 
people not getting the jokes if they have not been following news and current affairs. An 
uncritical view of such shows could be unadvisable though, as shows which use politics and 
news for entertainment purposes could trivialise, misrepresent, and/or sensationalise to gain 
viewers. These shows are possibly also not held to the same standards as journalists are since it 
might be considered entertainment or satire. Shows like these could be considered to be ‘news 
and current affairs’ in the European Social Survey questionnaire.  
Having a large percentage of the population not following news and current affairs may 
have the unfortunate effect that politics and public administration decay. Politics and public 
administration may fall to, or continue their unimpeded corrupt behaviour when they know a 
certain part of the citizenry, i.e. potential voters or otherwise punishers of corruption, are not 
watching them. A counteracting active civil society may form organisations for citizens to 
channel their preferences towards political elites and have their views represented (Rasmussen & 
Reher 2019). The civil society organisations may provide information in order to help people 
become better at interpreting politics and help policy-makers find out what public preferences 
are. Having people following the news and current affairs, which may be influenced by civil 
society organisations thus may lead people to see certain issues as important – such as corrupt 
public officials.  
Contrary, there is some research to suggest that political accountability can partly skip 
citizens role in punishing politicians for their corrupt or immoral behaviour. Policy-makers rely 
on information from media reports, which they may interpret as the public opinion on matters 
(Pritchard 1992). Knowing this, the media can report on issues they are interested in changing, 
causing policymakers to believe they are hearing the people’s voices even though it is only the 
voice of one journalist. The flow of information through media can be manipulated by vested 
interests (Fiorino et al. 2019). Politicians, owners of media, government control, new media 
regulations (such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) can all manipulate the information flow in 
some ways, and some more obvious than others. In some post-communist European countries, 
journalism is plagued by corruption, used as an instrument for promoting private interests (Price 
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2019). Having a compromised media may cause the role of journalism, as the watchdog for 
society, to fail.  
Price (2019: table 1) identifies several forms of journalistic corruption, parted into two 
brackets: individual corruption and institutional/organisational corruption. Individual journalistic 
corruption contains engaging in “black” Public Relations, arranging paid interviews or guest 
appearances, writing paid-for articles, accepting cash-in-hand, gifts or other perks, and 
exchanging personal favours with sources. Institutional/organisational journalistic corruption 
contains accepting state advertising and private sponsorship in exchange for withholding 
criticism, publishing hidden advertising, blacklisting or avoiding certain topics, conducting 
systematic and orchestrated smear campaigns on behalf of hidden sponsors, and blackmailing 
political and business actors. This gives a perspective on corruption and media in Eastern Europe 
that there might be issues with trust. Why watch the news if you know the media is corrupt and 
will only feed you what they want you to hear? Controlling the flow of information is a powerful 
tool, and could be detrimental to civil society participation if used for nefarious purposes. 
 Freedom of Information (FOI) laws are encouraged to combat corruption through 
transparency, but this has increased corruption perception, as noted by Costa (2012). Countries 
who have adopted the FOI laws saw an increase in corruption perception and a decrease in the 
quality of governance (Costa 2012). An increase in transparency may lead to better information 
on whom to bribe or connect with (Bac 2001). This lines up with the theory of ‘sand in the 
wheels’, arguing that corruption creates more incentives for bureaucracy (Myrdal 2007). 





Fair and unfair news 
 
Even though the media might be considered a watchdog of the political institutions, it is also a 
business, which means it is vital to have income. For media, this often means having people 
watching in order to serve them commercials. Having boring news that no one watches might 
then become an issue. As previous research teaches us, the media landscape of today is much 
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more varied today than before, and choices in exactly what people can watch is more prominent 
than ever (Prior 2005; Aalberg et al. 2013). This could mean a battle for ratings, and then more 
sensationalising of news. For state-run media one hopes to avoid this problem, but another arises. 
How can we be certain of the legitimacy of a state-run media channel to be unpartisan and 
critical towards its own employers – the government? Governments attempting to influence news 
content represent a threat to access to important and necessary information to the public, which 
in turn could affect the quality of democracy (Solis & Antenageli 2017).  
 Another issue with the media is bias and partisanship. Media can be controlled or 
influenced by vested interests, such as unions, political groups, or individuals. Having news 
stories about corruption tactically released around elections may cause voter loss for a given 
politician. Le Moglie & Turati (2019) show this in their assessment of biased media coverage 
around elections times in Italy. There is an incentive for politically biased news to show more 
wrongdoing in an election, as it may cause their political side to gain voters. It could also be that 
during elections, people are more willing to follow news and are thereby interested in such 
stories to inform them on who to vote for. Either way, this could cause problems for casual news 
followers since they now must also seek out to know if the information they are served is biased 
or not. Allegations of bias in news organisations because they cover stories of corruption can be 
hard to arbitrate. News worthiness and pursuing claims of corruption could become entwined 
with partisanship or other external influences (Tiffen 2004). As allegations of corrupt behaviour 
can cause great political harm to an individual, it is a great power to use against political 
opponents, even though it bears no evidence of truth. This could empower the beliefs of those 




Normative issues with international organisations 
 
For all its praise, civil society may not be the saving grace many want it to be. International 
organisations with a normative political agenda, such as Transparency International, believe that 
governments are supposed to protect the public good and foster public trust, through their help 
(Bukovansky 2002). Through their consultation, the anti-corruption organisations are to provide 
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states with advice and incentives for institutional reform – to teach them the ‘correct’ norms of 
what it means to be a good state. As Bukovansky (2002) points out, this implies that 
governments have the capacity, or are able to be pressured by civil society in order to institute 
reforms compatible with the concepts of public trust, accountability, and transparency.  
What these organisations may fail to consider is on who makes the decisions. In other 
words, can anti-corruption measures develop from the top-down or bottom-up? Are people in 
charge of changing their society through the community, or is it politicians and law-makers who 
shall create the laws they must adhere to? In an example from Georgia, there is a difficulty in 
finding a common narrative of success in the anti-corruption strategy employed (Di Puppo 
2013). There are disagreements between the government of Georgia and international 
organisations if Georgia has been a success story in their battle against corruption. It might come 
down to the methodology used in a given country – if it works and lines up with what a 
particular organisation’s ideals, it’s a success story in their eyes. Again, in the example of 
Georgia, the World Bank supports Georgia’s image as a reformer of corruption because it 
validates their methodology (Di Puppo 2013). Transparency International and the European 
Union disagrees because the changes made did not fit well into their narrative. If Georgia then is 
viewed as a success story, it may invalidate these organisations since their methodology was not 
used. This proves the need to understand international organisations as discursive objects which 
need to be studied, and not arbiters of the truth or objective representations of a subject.  
 Many of these non-government organisations base their normative stand against topics 
such as corruption on Western ideals. There is a notion of what corruption is, that it is bad, and 
that it must be fixed. This may not always line up with other cultures or societies. Some see 
public officials acting “corruptly” as part of the job, perhaps since the bureaucratic work is 
terribly paid, and therefore corruption perhaps can be seen as more of a tip than a moral slight – 
more like a benefit which comes with the job (Treisman 2000; Wedel 2015). If a country has a 
newly formed bureaucracy, for example, payment may be low, but as time increases, so does the 
opportunities for upward mobility for the bureaucrats. In China, the guanxi is normal procedure, 
even though much of it would be considered corruption in Western society (Andvig & Fjeldstad 
2001). What constitutes corruption in any given society depends on where and how that 
particular society draws the line between the public and private spheres, as well as public and 
private roles (Bukovansky 2002). The unified, normative truth of what corruption is should be 
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scrutinised for its push to internationalise a moral standard. The anti-corruption movement has 
concealed much of its agenda in economic development, and underdeveloped countries may 
have little to no say in their assessments and participation. What is considered to be a guide for 
good governance by the international organisation may be considered a new imperialist 
movement by others.  
 Another point of contention is the funding for non-governmental organisations. Wedel 
(2015) points out the big-league corporations who have sponsored Transparency International, 
such as Bank of America, Enron, Exxon, Ford, General Electric, Merk, American International 
Group, and Arthur Anderson. So why would these large corporations sponsor the anti-corruption 
sector? It is probably in their best interest to combat corruption and open up countries for new 
markets. As we have seen, corruption can mostly be argued to be a hindrance for economic 
growth, and investments into highly corrupt countries can be inefficient (Rose-Ackerman 1997; 
Méon & Weill 2009). Not only does combating corruption open up new markets, it also makes 




Differences in countries 
 
Northern European countries have all a high score of corruption cleanliness, as well as having an 
active citizenry following news and current event, plus having a high percentage of the 
population interested in politics. Northern European countries are noted for high amounts of 
social capital in terms of trust, associational membership, and informal interactions (Rothstein & 
Stolle 2003). Perhaps it is the trust that the news they are getting is factual, or that people feel the 
need to be informed because everyone else is. It could also be tied to the countries being 
relatively small in population, and that the population is quite homogenous. The reasons why are 
most likely multivariate, but there seems to be something that makes Northern Europeans more 
participatory, at least in following news and politics.  
 Eastern European countries contrast the Northern European countries by mostly scoring 
on the low end of the Corruption Perception Index, media following, and political interest. This 
could be attributed by the legacy of communism which undermined civil society development in 
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Central and Eastern Europe, but according to Zakaria (2012) this argument is no longer plausible 
since it has been years since the first democratic transition took place. In fact, there is a new 
post-communist generation who never experienced communism who are now participating in 
civil society. The question then becomes: do these post-communist youths act differently than 
the previous generation? Zakaria (2012) argues that the new generations in Eastern and Central 
Europe does not differ much from previous generations, staying apathetic towards civil society. 
As we see from the differences in Eastern European countries following news from European 
Social Survey rounds 1-2 (2002-2005) and rounds 4-5 (2008-2011), more people followed news 
in the older rounds than the new ones11 (Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.3), so perhaps looking to the 
past generations for blame is wrong. The percentage of people not following news or current 
affairs have also risen in all Eastern European countries with data from both ESS 1-2 and 4-5 
(Figure 4.2 and 4.4).  
 It could be that living conditions and declining macroeconomic conditions have 
contributed to distrust in civic organisations and political institutions. Citizens of post-
Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe have an attitude of scepticism towards civil 
society institutions, but trust is speculated to be slowly rising with gains in freedoms and fairness 
(Mishler & Rose 1997). Perhaps it comes down to a country’s wealth – resources and skills. It 
has been noted that the more wealth a country has, the higher its share of group members is 
(Zakaria 2012). As we have seen, there are robust correlations between being asked for a bribe 
and trust in public officials, and it is higher than other structural characteristics in countries, such 
as wealth, income distribution, and education (Table 6.3).  
 The possibility that Eastern European countries may have trust issues is also considered. 
When countries are quite corrupt it may cause trust issues, which may make it hard for people to 
willingly join civil society groups. The issues of trust and perceptions of corruption influences 
peoples’ trust in civil society (Zakaria 2012). There are many incidents of bribery in Eastern 
European countries in our findings (Figure 3.1), which means people will trust public officials 




11 With the exception of Estonia which increased their news following from ESS 1-2 to ESS 4-5 from approximately 





The findings of this study emphasize the importance for policy-makers to understand how the 
citizenry keeps up with news, and that if people do not follow news and current affairs there 
might be consequences. With more media choice and new media influences, such as independent 
news on YouTube, blogs, and social media, people can pick and choose exactly what they want 
to hear and see. This also means there might be an issue with political bias, where people only 
seek to reinforce what they already believe. However, it is argued that print and electronic forms 
of media remain important for the public to receive information and form opinions on topics 
(Masters & Graycar 2015).  
As we have stated earlier, policy-makers must understand that the flow of information 
may be controlled by certain actors to front their agendas. Media can control what is being 
written and shown in order to influence both the public, if they are watching, and policy-makers. 
Media itself may also be corrupt (Price 2019), which destroys trust and credibility.  
Policy-makers must also understand that the media can be biased. Partisanship may cause 
media to become an active participant in events, instead of just reporting on them. Having a 
media which influences could be detrimental to civil society and the public at large, since it 
would have media, or other market elites, steer the ship towards their own agenda (Masters & 
Graycar 2015).  
There are different strategies for corruption reform: individual-level reward and 
punishment strategies, macro strategies of making changes in an entire society during a “big 
bang”, and organisational-level strategies that address individual organisations (Prasad et al. 
2019). The reward and punishment approach seeks to reward or punish agents (i.e. public 
officials). This strategy requires monitoring of possible corrupt actors, and thus gives importance 
to reporting of corrupt behaviour. The media can report corrupt incidents to citizens who then 
can vote or pressure in the “right people” into the “right positions” to get rid of unwanted 
behaviour. With this approach, there can be a prominent issue when the whole system is corrupt. 
So this approach may only work well in countries which are already relatively clean of 
corruption as a control mechanism (Prasad et al. 2019). This can also apply to corrupt media. If 
the media benefits from corruption, what would be their incentive to report on it? 
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The macro strategy for a massive change, referred to as a “big bang”, targets systemic 
corruption in an attempt to change the entire system over a short period of time (Rothstein 2011; 
Prasad et al. 2019). Again, an issue here could be the question on who will bring in the “big 
bang” that cleanses the system of corruption? In a country that is systematically corrupt, where 
does change spring out from? Perhaps the citizens are fed up with it, and it sparks some form of 
revolution, or some form of intervening from other countries or organisations. International 
organisations could, for example, put pressure on countries they classify as corrupt in order to 
bring some form of change. This may be problematic as the views on corruption from an 
international organisation may differ from the alleged corrupt country’s views. Targeting news 
would be a useful strategy for informing citizens in a corrupt country, especially in the modern 
media landscape, where people are able to follow international news (for example BBC or Sky 
world news, though there are many more choice here).  
The third anti-corruption strategy points to relatively uncorrupted organisations in 
corrupted countries to be a good approach. Corruption-free organisations can influence their 
surroundings through networking and demands (such as demanding corruption free dealings in 
some sector of the economy), if they are powerful actors in some way (Prasad et al. 2019). This 
can lead to more and more organisations taking up non-corrupt practices, eventually leading to a 
“cleaner” society. Within this approach, we could argue that media, if uncorrupted, could lead 
the way in informing citizens and policy-makers to get rid of unwanted behaviour. Exposure of 
corruption could also lead to civil society activity, meaning people organising to fight for the 






In this study we have focused on the correlation between corruption and news consumption. 
Perceived corruption from various elite’s assessments of the issue is correlated with people’s 
media use at the level of countries. If people follow the news and current affairs corruption 
cleanliness will usually be higher in their country. If the citizenry is not following news and 
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current affairs, corruption festers and grows. Corruption experience in the form of regular 
people’s response to bribery incidents correlate less highly with our media variables.  
 We have also discussed some issues with using business people’s assessments of 
corruption, noting that they may experience different types of corruption than regular people. 
There is also criticism of the CPI, mainly that it undermines the incredibly complex subject of 
corruption and simplifies it into a scale from 0-100 – granted this makes quantitative analyses 
much easier. Also, corruption perception can be important because it could have real 
implications on policy, even though experienced corruption might not be a “real” problem 
(Masters & Graycar 2015). 
 There are also some issues with normativity in the anti-corruption industry. Corruption is 
mainly seen as something bad with a society that must be fixed (Bukovansky 2002). What 
constitutes corruption may, however, depend on cultural factors. People may think corruption is 
negative in most places, but what they think of as corruption can differ – i.e. the discourse 
around corruption is culturally based (Gupta 1995). International organisations such as 
Transparency International or the World Bank may clash with other cultures assessments of 
corruption. What works in combating corruption in one area of the world may not work in 
another, or different organisations can assess victories over corruption as “not done right” 
because it was not done in the manner they believe it should have been done (Di Puppo 2013).  
In the end, it comes down to what policy-makers decide to do about corruption. They can 
make mistakes by believing public assessments of corruption to be synonymous with what the 
media decides to cover. Media can have their own agenda, whether it be to keep society corrupt, 
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Table A: Showing countries with their iso3 country codes. N = 34 
Country Country 
Code (iso3) 
 Country Country 
Code (iso3) 
Austria AUT  Latvia LVA 
Belgium BEL  Lithuania LTU 
Bulgaria BGR  Luxembourg LUX 
Croatia HRV  Netherlands NLD 
Cyprus CYP  Norway NOR 
Czech Republic CZE  Poland POL 
Denmark DNK  Portugal PRT 
Estonia EST  Romania ROU 
Finland FIN  Russia RUS 
France FRA  Slovakia SVK 
Germany DEU  Slovenia SVN 
Greece GRC  Spain ESP 
Hungary HUN  Sweden SWE 
Iceland ISL  Switzerland CHE 
Ireland IRL  Turkey TUR 
Israel ISR  Ukraine UKR 
Italy ITA  United Kingdom GBR 
 
